THE RETREAT FROM DEMOCRACY IN SIERRA LEONE

John E. Moore
Savannah State College

When Sierra Leoneans celebrated the end of British rule on 27 April 1961, they did so in a mood of unrestrained optimism. "All the omens," as one later wrote, "seemed to indicate that Sierra Leone would succeed after independence and that it might serve as an example for the rest of Africa."[1] Such high expectations reflected the ease with which independence had been achieved. Sierra Leone's leaders had never had to struggle for independence and, in fact, had been content until they saw the rest of Britain's African colonies becoming independent. It had actually been the British themselves who had initiated the process of decolonization in Sierra Leone.

By a gradual approach to the transfer of power, moreover, the British had given Sierra Leone time to develop a written constitution and its leaders the experience needed to have a functioning government in place at independence. The British thus left on the best of terms leaving behind a country with the highest level of education in sub-Saharan Africa and a well-trained civil service and judiciary. Britain's success seemed apparent when, in April, 1960, the Sierra Leone Constitutional Independence Conference was held at Lancaster House in London. In sharp contrast with the acrimonious conferences held for Britain's other colonies, the meeting between Sierra Leone's leaders and British officials was, in Gershon Collier's words, "an exercise in mutual admiration with the British congratulating the Sierra Leoneans and the Sierra Leoneans congratulating the British."[2]

In what has been termed "the euphoric days of

independence,"[3] consequently, few Sierra Leoneans would have predicted that within the decade their new nation would experience economic collapse, military coups, one-party rule, dictatorship, domestic bloodshed and violations of human and civil rights. Many would later attribute this retreat from democracy and its misfortunes to the country's leaders and their desire for wealth and power. But while such human weaknesses certainly contributed to the disaster, the British were also partly responsible for the country's sad fate. The manner in which they had established and maintained their rule, together with the changes this brought and the steps they took to assure their influence after independence, made it likely that things would soon fall apart in an independent Sierra Leone.

The most important cause of Sierra Leone's retreat from democracy has been the bitter divisions within its society. Although the fact that Sierra Leoneans are divided into no less than twelve tribal groups partly explains the divisiveness of their political life, the most important causes of the conflicts are to be found in the origins of the colony itself and in British rule.[4]

It is ironic that Britain, which profited more than any other nation from the African slave trade, should have established Sierra Leone as a consequence of the abolitionist movement. In 1772, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Mansfield, ruled that there was no basis in English law for slavery--thus abolishing slavery in England. At the time there were already many free blacks in the country and this number increased as slaves freed by British troops in the American Revolution made their way to Britain.

Blacks faced lives of destitution and discrimination in Britain, and many became vagrants in London or other ports. Granville Sharp, who has supported the litigation that brought the Mansfield Decision, along with other abolitionists decided to

sponsor repatriation of the former slaves to Africa. They selected Sierra Leone as the place to send them.[5]

Sharp approached British officials for support and found them willing to make a small grant. Finding blacks willing to go to Sierra Leone, where they might be returned to slavery, was more difficult. Seven hundred of the fifteen thousand blacks signed up, but only two hundred fifty showed up to go and authorities had to resort to rounding up all black beggars in London's streets to provide the settlers. In February 1787, three transports carrying four hundred fifty-six passengers, including sixty white prostitutes, sailed from Portsmouth for Sierra Leone. A bad storm drove the ships back to Plymouth where one hundred colonists were lost to disease, death and desertion while the ships prepared to sail again. With losses partially replaced, the expedition sailed again in April carrying four hundred eleven settlers of which three hundred seventy-seven were landed in Sierra Leone 10 May 1787.[6]

The British intended that Sierra Leone should be a self-governing colony of small farmers and, in return for £60 worth of goods, the expedition bought almost twenty square miles of land from the local Temne chief in the area where they landed. Unfortunately, the venture was poorly planned, badly executed and inadequately supported. A third of the settlers died from disease within three months while others left the colony and went to work for the slavetraders in the area. The remaining colonists soon came into conflict with the Temne who attacked and burned the settlement. The colony thus failed completely leaving behind a few wretched survivors, a tradition of animosity against the indigenous people and a conviction among the abolitionists that a stronger government and greater initial support would be required for success in any future attempt.[7]

Although the British Government had provided more than £15,000 for stores, provisions and transportation for the first

settlers, it was reluctant to spend any more money to support an unwanted colony in Sierra Leone. The abolitionists thus turned to the London business community for support and formed the Sierra Leone Company. Incorporated by Parliament in 1791, the company was intended to make profits from trade with the hinterland while repatriated Africans were making new lives for themselves. Its supporters raised over £235,000 in capital and, in February 1792, they sent out one hundred nineteen whites to run the colony. They solved the problem of finding black settlers by recruiting twelve hundred former slaves freed in The American Revolution and living in Nova Scotia.

Despite the increased support, the second venture also failed. Most of the whites sent out promptly died from disease.[8] The trade with the interior and the expected profits never materialized. War with France in 1793 raised the cost of supplying the colony and, in 1794, the French attacked and burned the settlement. The Nova Scotian blacks resisted company rule and rebelled in 1799. Only the timely arrival of a new contingent of blacks from Nova Scotia, who quelled the rebellion, saved company rule. Truth to tell, the colony barely managed to survive until January 1, 1808 when the British Government finally took charge.[9] By that time the British had already established the pattern for their relationship with Sierra Leone.

Although some abolitionists served in the British government during the last decades of the 18th century, their humanitarian concerns were less important than financial considerations in determining the Government's policy regarding Sierra Leone. Poor blacks, whether in London or Nova Scotia, were always considered a problem and often a financial burden. British officials deemed it cheaper to transport emancipated blacks to Sierra Leone, where they were expected to support themselves by farming, than to pay for their upkeep elsewhere.[10] They hoped

that trade with the area might bring profits, but the dominant motive was the desire to save on costs and this continued to be the case when the colony came under the Crown and experienced rapid population growth.

One way to keep costs low was to have few Englishmen employed in administering the colony. The British Government was thus quite willing to follow the practice established during the first two attempts to found the colony. Whenever possible it would allow the emancipated blacks a role in the governance of the colony. It was cheaper to use blacks to rule blacks than to pay Englishmen to do the job.[11]

Keeping costs down was a major problem as Sierra Leone experienced rapid growth as a result of British attempts to end the Atlantic slave trade by having the Royal Navy intercept slave ships leaving Africa for the New World. Although the effort was unsuccessful, the patrols did capture over 1287 slave ships between 1825 and 1867 and released almost 130,000 slaves.[12] The British thus confronted the problems of maintaining the naval patrols, adjudicating the seized slave ships, and providing for the recaptives, i.e. the released slaves. They decided to use Sierra Leone as the solution to their problems.

As one of the few natural anchorages on the West African coast, the estuary of the Sierra Leone River had been a favorite refuge for European ships needing fresh food and water since its discovery in the 15th century. When the Admiralty stationed its vessels in West African waters to intercept slave ships, it naturally chose Sierra Leone as the port for victualing them. Rather than maintaining Admiralty courts along the slave coasts to adjudicate the seized slave ships and returning the freed slaves to their homelands, the British took the cheaper option of taking the ships to Sierra Leone and simply releasing the slaves there. Some of the recaptives managed to make the journey from Sierra Leone back to

their homelands. Most remained in Sierra Leone where, together with the former slaves from Nova Scotia and Britain, they formed a class of Africans whose tribal bonds had been broken by enslavement and whose language, religion and culture became, in time, British.

The British authorities expected the recaptives to settle in farming villages and support themselves without any government assistance. The villages, alas, could not survive without continued government support and that meant that the cost of administering the colony increased with its population. Between 1815 and 1824, for example, the colony's cost to the British Treasury grew from £29,000 to £95,000.[13]

The poor quality of the soil in the colony, in fact, made it impossible for the recaptives to live by farming and quite likely they would turn to trading.[14] Sierra Leone's role as a supply port also created tempting opportunities for trade. Whatever their individual reasons, many of the recaptives left the villages, moved to Freetown and emulated the whites in the colony.[15] These assimilated Africans became known as Creoles and, in time, their elite included both successful merchants and professional men.

Officials in the colony found this advantageous. The Creoles contributed to the economy and, instead of being a burden on the treasury, they paid taxes. They provided literate manpower for the administration, private companies and the missions. They were enthusiastic collaborators and, when they sought during the 1850s to participate in the colonial government, the British were willing to allow them to do so. In 1863, consequently, the British granted a new constitutional charter creating an appointed Legislative Council in which, for the first time, Creoles were given representation.[16]

The Creoles had sought participation in the government to further their own economic interests. Most of all, they wanted

the British to stop the disorder and tribal wars common in the colony's hinterland to facilitate trade. As usual, the British did not want to incur the costs that policing and administering the region might entail. They thus refused to expand their rule into the interior until the French began to move into the area, and then the British used the cheapest possible method. Rather than expanding the colony or establishing a new one, they chose to establish a separate protectorate which they would rule from Sierra Leone.[17]

The British declaration of a Protectorate on August 31, 1896 brought some 27,000 square miles of land and an estimated million Africans under British rule.[18] It also brought a substantial expense which the Colonial Office refused to pay contending that the Protectorate or, if necessary, the colony should meet the additional costs. The authorities in the Colony then made a decision that would affect relations between the Creoles and the Protectorate peoples until the present day. They imposed a "Hut Tax" in the Protectorate.

The Protectorate's inhabitants responded to the tax by staging in 1898 the bloody "Hut Tax Rebellion" to drive out the whites and slaughter all blacks who dressed, talked or acted like whites, i.e., the Creoles who were in the Protectorate.[19] The British crushed the rebellion with the usual severity, but the Creoles would neither forgive nor forget the loss of lives and property during the rebellion. Their resentment against the Protectorate people further increased when the British made them pay the £50,000 cost of suppressing the rebellion and forbade the Creoles from owning land in the Protectorate while allowing the immigrants from the Protectorate to do so in the Colony.[20]

Alarmed by the rebellion, moreover, the British became suspicious of all blacks--including Creoles. They thus postponed further steps toward representative government in the Colony which the Creoles had been seeking. Thus the "unofficial"

members of the Legislative Council were not increased even though the population of the Colony grew rapidly as a result of the establishment of the Protectorate.[21]

The manner in which the British decided to administer the new Protectorate also served to perpetuate the differences between the Creoles and the people living there while maintaining a form of local government the Creoles regarded as uncivilized. The British decided to rule the Protectorate through the existing system of Paramount Chiefs. Although this method of indirect rule required only a few white District Commissioners and their assistants to control the Protectorate and cost very little money, using the chiefs as agents of imperial rule and their collaborators had significant consequences.

While preserving the Chiefdoms themselves, the British curtailed their judicial powers and sources of income and, more important, destroyed the traditional systems of checks on their behavior, i.e., their own people would often kill or drive their chiefs away when they become corrupt or abused their powers. The British viewed such killings as murders and refused to allow the old methods to be used. As the British did not have enough officials to police the Chiefs, the latter often used their positions to enrich themselves and their families. The result was violent riots during which the property obtained by corrupt chiefs was often destroyed.[22] The British authorities then had to suppress the disturbances and maintain their collaborators in power by force.

A second consequence was that when a new class of educated westernized Africans began to develop in the Protectorate, it would find that politics was largely the provinces of the Paramount Chiefs. The only way they could share in the governance of the Protectorate was to cooperate with the Chiefs. An alliance thus developed between the leaders of the new westernized elite and the traditional elite, and when representative

institutions were introduced during decolonization the latter would produce the votes needed by the former to gain political office.[23]

The Creoles, who had opposed establishing the Protectorate, now found their own position declining. A sudden influx of immigrants from the Protectorate made them a numerical minority in the Colony. The British allowed Lebanese merchants to settle in Freetown where they completed effectively with the Creoles. As health conditions improved, more whites began to arrive and the Creoles soon found that qualifications for positions in the administration, church and even commerce were being raised and that the best positions were all going to whites.[24] As their influence declined and their discontent increased, the Creoles pressed for more political power in the hope that would improve their situation.

The Creoles who sought to change the 1863 Constitution believed that this would give them greater control even though they were small in number. Under the British Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, the inhabitants of the Protectorate were not subjects of the Crown and it would thus be illegal for them to be represented in the Legislative Council.

The British, moreover, left education to the churches and missions. As they had established few schools in the Protectorate, only about five percent of the people living there were literate as compared with eighty percent in the colony.[25] Most literates in the Colony were Creoles and, if literacy was required for the franchise, they would naturally win any elections there. Unless the British decided to allow illiterate foreigners i.e., the residents of the Protectorate to vote and make laws for British subjects, which seemed most unlikely, the Creoles would have control during any transfer of power. Unfortunately for the Creoles, the "unlikely" was exactly what the British decided to do.

Although the British began decolonization in Sierra Leone

in 1947, steps toward the transfer of power actually began with a new constitution in 1924. The latter expanded the Legislative Council from ten to twenty-two members, i.e., twelve official members and ten unofficial members. Eight of the twenty-two members were not Africans. Three of the eight were Paramount Chiefs appointed by the Governor to represent the Protectorate.

The British imposed the new constitution over the vehement opposition of the Creoles. They strongly objected to having any representatives from the Protectorate in the Legislative Council which, they feared, would lead to a unitary state dominated by the Protectorate. They also objected to having Paramount Chiefs Legislative Council.[26] They asserted that the Chiefs would always vote the way the British District Commissioners in the Protectorate advised them to vote.

The British thought the 1924 Constitution to be quite generous to the Creoles and a reasonable step to take. The Ordinance in Council creating the Protectorate in 1895 had authorized the Legislative Council to make laws for the Protectorate and it had done so. Thus the "unitary state" the Creoles feared already existed and the new constitution simply gave representation to the people in the Protectorate. Seventy per cent of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council represented the Colony which had only ten per cent of the population. Five of the eight Africans in the Council were Creoles. Their domination in the Colony was assured by the fact that the franchise was so restricted by income and literacy requirements that only 1,866 of the more than 85,000 people living there could vote.

Fearing that the way was now open for domination by the illiterate, politically backward and uncivilized Protectorate Chiefs, the Creoles pressed demands for an unofficial member majority in the Legislative Council that would come from the Colony. The

British refused the Creole demands and made it clear that a majority of the unofficial members in the Council would have to come from the Protectorate rather than the Colony. When they established a new Protectorate Assembly in 1945, they also made it clear that the unofficial members in the Council from the Protectorate would be their collaborators, i.e., the Paramount Chiefs.[27]

The British created the new Assembly to give the Protectorate leaders practical political experience. Twenty-six of the forty-two seats in the Assembly were reserved for Government Officials. Two seats were reserved for the educated Africans in the Protectorate. The Creoles, missionaries and European businessmen in the Protectorate were each given one seat. With nearly sixty per cent of the seats, the Paramount Chiefs had no difficulty dominating the Assembly.[28] By giving only two seats to the westernized educated elite in the Protectorate, the British excluded the latter from participation in political life. The elite reacted by breaking its alliance with the Chiefs, forming the Sierra Leone Organization Society and bitterly attacking the British for having given the Paramount Chiefs a virtual monopoly over power.

When the British Government decided in 1947 to prepare its African territories for independence, officials in Sierra Leone had already decided what should be done there. Firstly, the Colony and Protectorate should form a unitary state. Secondly, the majority of members in the Legislative Council should come from the Protectorate rather than from the Colony. Thirdly, members of the Council from the Protectorate should be the collaborators there, i.e., the Paramount Chiefs, rather than from the westernized educated elite there. They thus proposed a new constitution providing for an expanded Legislative Council of twenty-four members of which sixteen would be unofficial members. Fourteen of the latter would be Africans with four being elected in the

Colony and ten coming from the Protectorate Assembly, i.e., from the Paramount Chiefs.[29]

Both the Creoles and the new educated class in the Protectorate strongly opposed the British proposals. The Creoles attacked the new constitution as a violation of the British Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 and the Protectorate people as tribal savages who had slaughtered civilized Creoles in the "Hut Tax Rebellion" of 1898. They demanded additional seats in the Legislative Council for themselves and a literacy requirement for all members of the Council. That would have disqualified eighty per cent of all Protectorate Chiefs and fifty per cent of the Paramount Chiefs in the Protectorate Assembly.[30] When their arguments and petitions failed to move the British, they demanded that the British either annex the Protectorate and make its people British subjects or allow the Colony and Protectorate to have their own legislatures and the Colony to have self-government.[31]

The middle class educated Africans in the Protectorate joined the Creoles in opposition to the proposals because they were to be excluded from the new Legislative Council as they had been from the Protectorate Assembly. They wanted a Protectorate majority in the Council but, even more, they wanted to be included in that majority. Fortunately for the British, they did not object to sharing power with the Paramount Chiefs. There was thus room for compromise and the British could make a deal.

When it became clear after three years of Creole vituperation that the Creoles would never agree to a Protectorate majority in the Legislative Council, the British again simply went ahead and imposed a new constitution over Creole objections. Promulgated on 19 November 1951, the new constitution provided for a Legislative Council of eight Europeans and twenty-one Africans and gave fourteen seats to the Protectorate and seven to the Colony. Only the representatives from the Colony were to be

elected by voters on a very restricted franchise, i.e., only 5,000 literate adult males among the 123,000 people now living in the Colony could vote.[32] Only two of the fourteen members from the Protectorate were to be elected by the Protectorate Assembly. The remaining twelve were to represent the administrative districts in the Protectorate and were to be elected by the District Council. Although the latter were under the control of the Chiefs, this modification in the British 1947 proposal allowed the educated elite in the Protectorate the opportunity to sit in the Legislative Council.

The bitter controversy over the 1951 constitution shaped politics in Sierra Leone during the 1950s and 1960s. The invective used by the Creoles during the controversy revived the animosities between themselves and the Protectorate peoples. A Creole politician now has no chance of gaining support in the Protectorate. The best educated and most politically experienced individuals in Sierra Leone now faced the prospect of either withdrawing from public life or being in permanent opposition to the Government.

In the Protectorate, on the other hand, the controversy brought the new educated elite and the Chiefs closer together. The educated elite in the Protectorate used riots in their effort to force the British to modify their plan to give the Paramount Chiefs a monopoly over representation in the Legislative Council. The use of force had worked and it would be used again.

The controversy also produced the political party that would take charge during the transfer of power. The leaders of the Sierra Leone Organization Society in the Protectorate transformed the organization into the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) as the means to get control under the new constitution. Although the SLPP was not a genuine political party because it did not need to mobilize a large number of voters in order to win elections and thus made no effort to gain a mass membership or develop an

organization, it easily took power then elections were held in 1951. Its leader, Dr. Milton Margai, thus became Chief Minister (1951-53) Premier (1953-58); and Prime Minister (1958-64).

Once the 1951 constitution was in place and the Creoles had lost their influence in the Legislative Council, the leaders of the SLPP easily obtained further changes to improve their control. The literacy requirement for voting was dropped and the constitution was revised in 1956 replacing the Legislative Council with a House of Representatives of fifty-eight members. The Colony was now to elect fourteen members while the Protectorate was represented by twenty-five elected members and twelve Paramount Chiefs elected by the District Councils. After elections were held in 1957, the SLPP had forty-five supporters in the House of Representatives. The second largest party, the United Progressive Party of the Creoles, had only five members in the House.[33]

The SLPP's overwhelming victory in 1957 seemed to indicate that it had the support of most Sierra Leoneans and that the country was ready to move towards independence. The latter was accomplished through a final constitution establishing the Legislature--giving it the authority to determine its own composition in the future--and providing "entrenched clauses" to protect the institutions of government, human rights and the Paramount Chiefs. The constitution went into effect with independence in 1961 and the collapse of Sierra Leone began the following year.

The first indication that divisions within Sierra Leone would bring political strife after independence came at the end of the Sierra Leone Constitutional Independence Conference in 1960. At that time Siaka Stevens, one of the founders of the SLPP, announced that he would refuse to sign the agreement reached with the British. He then walked out of the conference, returned to Sierra Leone and formed a new political party, the All Peoples

Congress, to oppose the new government. Stevens' action shocked many at the time, but few realized that it signaled the start of a struggle for power.

When Sierra Leone held its first post-independence elections in 1962, the campaigns were often characterized by violence and the use of intimidation as candidates hired thugs to beat up supporters of their opponents and to defend their supporters against the thugs hired by their opponents. Such practices were so common, in fact, that there was a severe shortage of thugs. The outcome of the election, in any case, was a disappointment for the SLPP which lost its majority of the elected members of the House of Representatives which declared their support of leader, Sir Milton Margai, only after the Governor-General had asked him to form a government.

When Sir Milton died in April 1964, he was replaced as Prime Minister by his brother, Sir Albert Margai. Facing a collapsing economy and growing discontent, the new Prime Minister decided that the best way in which to keep himself and the SLPP in power was to eliminate all other parties and establish a one-party system for Sierra Leone. He was unable to achieve his goal and when the next elections were held in 1967, the SLPP won fewer seats in the House than Siaka Stevens' All Peoples Congress. Stevens thus became Prime Minister only to be immediately overthrown by a military coup staged by Sir Albert's supporters in the Army. Within twenty-four hours, however, other officers staged a second coup overthrowing Sir Albert and taking power themselves. They ruled the country for a year when they were themselves overthrown in a third coup staged by non-commissioned officers. They then returned Stevens to power as Prime Minister. He proceeded to establish the one-party system Sir Albert had wanted--forcing all members of the House of Representatives to join his APC-- and ruled Sierra Leone with an

"iron hand" for the next seventeen years.

Sierra Leone's retreat from democracy to dictatorship was, of course, a fate shared with the other independent African nations. One might suggest, however, that the British Officials who ruled Sierra Leone were largely responsible for what eventually took place after independence. At the start they had viewed the colony as a means to save money for the British taxpayers and they were determine throughout their rule that it should never become a financial burden to Britain. They refused to spend funds to educate Sierra Leoneans or to develop the country. They created a class of Creoles in the colony and, when they expanded their rule to the interior, denied that class a significant role in the administration of the Protectorate. Instead, they decided to rely on the Paramount Chiefs to rule the Protectorate. While that certainly saved money for the British taxpayers, it also preserved tribal affiliations and prevented the educated westernized elite in the Protectorate from developing the skills needed to operate a democracy or to create a genuine political party. And as they approached the end of their rule in Sierra Leone, finally, the British did all that they could to protect the interests of their collaborators and to make sure that they would remain in power after independence. The British made the key decisions for Sierra Leone during its colonial period. Had they decided differently during their rule, things might well have turned out differently after their rule.

NOTES

1. Gershon Collier, *Sierra Leone: Experiment in Democracy in an African Nation* (New York: 1970), xvii.

2. *Ibid.*, 29.

3. Alexander P. Kup, *Sierra Leone: A Concise History* (London: 1975), 223.

4. Most of the 2,180,000 Sierra Leoneans in 1961 were Mende (672,000) or Temne (648,000). See J. Barry Riddell, *The Spatial Dynamics of Modernization in Sierra Leone: Structure, Diffusion and Response* (Evanston: 1970), 114.

5. For accounts of early European contact with Sierra Leone, see F.D. Fage, *An Introduction to the History of West Africa* (New York: 1960), 45; and Christopher Fyfe, *A History of Sierra Leone* (London: 1962), 1-12.

6. John Peterson, *Province of Freedom: A History of Sierra Leone, 1787-1870* (Evanston:, 1969), 19-27. It provides an excellent account of the first attempted settlement of Sierra Leone.

7. Only about fifty of the original settlers were found alive when the second settlement was established. See Kup, p. 120. On the impact of the failure, see A.T. Porter, "The Social Background of Political Decision Makers in Sierra Leone," *Sierra Leone Studies*, new series, 13 (1960): 4.

8. Sierra Leone became known as the "White Man's Grave" because it was so unhealthy for Europeans. See F.A.J. Utting, *The Story of Sierra Leone* (New York: 1930), 159.

9. Fage, 109. The Blacks were Jamaican maroons who had been taken to Nova Scotia.

10. On the British desire to save on the costs of supporting the former slaves, see Kup, 147.

11. Porter, 4.

12. Fage, 104.

13. Kup, 153.

14. J.D. Hargreaves, *A Life of Sir Samuel Lewis* (London: 1958), 3.

15. Roy Lewis, *Sierra Leone: A Modern Portrait* (London: 1954), 35. See also Arthur t. Porter, *Creoledom: A Study in the Development of Freetown Society* (London: 1963), 35-65.

16. Porter, 6.

17. Christopher H. Fyfe, "European and Creole Influence in the Hinterland of Sierra Leone Before 1896," *Sierra Leone Studies*, new series, 6 (1956): 114; and J.D. Hargreaves, "The Evolution of the Native African Affairs Department," *Sierra Leone Studies*, new series, 3 (1954): 170.

18. Fyfe, 541-42.

19. K.L. Little, *The Mende of Sierra Leone* (London: 1961), 52.

20. Michael Banton, "Adaption and Integration in the Social System of Temne Immigrants in Freetown," *Africa*, 26 (1956): 356. See Fyfe, 593, on the Colony's repayment of the cost of the Hut Tax Rebellion. The British Government refused to pay for the property destroyed during the rebellion and owned by the Creoles unless the latter could prove Government negligence.

21. Porter, 7.

22. See K.L. Little, "Mende Political Institutions in Transition," *Africa*, 27 (1947): 19; and Vernon R. Dorjhan, "The Changing Political System of the Temne," *Africa*, 30 (1960): 110. On the problem of corruption, see Victor Minikin, "Indirect Political Participation in Two Sierra Leone Chiefdoms," *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 11 (1973): 130; and Roger Tangri, "Conflict and Violence in Contemporary Sierra Leone Chiefdoms," *Journals of Modern African Studies*, 14 (1976): 311-21.

23. On the development of the new elite, see K.L. Little, "Social Change and Social Class in the Sierra Leone Protectorate," *American Journal of Sociology* 4 (1948): 12.

24. On the decline of Creole dominance, see Michael Banton, *West African City: A Study of Tribal Life in Freedom* (London: 1957), 102.

25. On education and literacy, see Margaret Wrong, *West African Journey* (London: 1946), 66; and Elizabeth M. Thompson, *Other Lands--Other Peoples* (Washington: 1961), 47.

26. Martin Kilson, *Political Change in a West African State* (Cambridge: 1966), 124-38. See also Kup, 202-03.

27. Collier, 13.

28. Kilson, 155.

29. Collier, 13-14.

30. Kilson, 164.

31. James R. Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone, 1947-67* (Toronto: 1970), 54.

32. *Ibid.*, 55.

33. *African Diary*, March 5, 1985, No. 12233.