

ATLANTA'S CENTRAL AVENUE AND PRYOR STREET VIADUCTS, 1923-1929

George M. Cronin
Kennesaw State College

Atlanta, from its beginnings as a crude railroad town in the 1830s, was becoming a great metropolis by the mid-1920s.¹ In the period between 1921 and 1928 some 12,036 new single family dwellings were built.¹ Peachtree street, which was once the principal residential street running right into the center of Atlanta, was becoming a business center.¹ The automobile and its related businesses were opening up new fields of employment for urbanites. Use of automobiles also made rural goods flow easier into the city. The Albert Steiner Clinic for the treatment of cancer was nearing completion at Grady hospital. School buildings, water works extension and sewers were not only increasing the labor force, but modernizing conditions for Atlantans. In 1924 building permits were issued for what amounted to \$27,000,000 worth of new construction in Atlanta. In 1927, Atlanta hosted 328 conventions that were attended by 61,153 visitors.¹ More doctors, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and social clubs were establishing themselves in the city. In an average month, some 228 passenger trains and 396 freight trains passed through Atlanta. As the central business district grew around Whitehall Street, Peachtree Street and Central Avenue, a problem was becoming increasingly obvious to Atlantans. To go from the north to the south side of town meant crossing more than a half-dozen train tracks. Hazards to pedestrians and motorists were becoming a daily routine.⁵ To many political, civic, and business leaders these hazards posed a serious problem. City leaders were

also concerned that these hazards would make it difficult to attract economic growth around Atlanta's central downtown area.

Ever since the economic destruction of Atlanta during the Civil War, recovery had been an important issue in the city. In 1916, *The City Builder*, a monthly publication of the Chamber of Commerce, published a letter stating nine reasons why businesses should locate in Atlanta. These reasons included Atlanta being the largest Southeast city, its major communications companies, religious centers, climate, "and most important, its men and women[s] . . . incomparable spirit."⁵ This type of promotion was having a direct impact on Atlanta. The political leaders of Atlanta were thus confronted with a major obstacle in their attempt to build a centralized city: how to connect the north and south side of central Atlanta, separated by the numerous rail lines.

This would be no easy task since, as Howard Preston writes, Atlanta, like most cities, was built by chance, not design. Thoroughfares were laid out to serve the railroads which in the 1920s were the backbone of Atlanta's economy. To compensate for the way the tracks were laid out, most "major streets radiated at right angles from the railroad tracks -- which cut a gaping furrow through the central business district -- and later intersected with other thoroughfares to form a rigid rectilinear pattern."⁷ It is not surprising that in 1924 the American Electric Railway Association, in its study of major American cities, cited Atlanta as one of the worst in serious traffic problems.⁷ Beginning with his first campaign speech in early 1922,⁹ Mayor Walter A. Sims, of Atlanta, came to the conclusion that "Twin Viaducts" at Central Avenue and Pryor Street were necessary to connect the north and south central business districts. Viaducts are structures that carry a roadway or the like over a valley or ravine, whether the

valley or ravine is natural or man made. Mayor Sims' purpose was to get pedestrians and automobiles safely across the rail lines by creating a ravine, lowering the rail lines, and then building viaducts across them. Why Mayor Sims decided to build viaducts at Central Avenue and Pryor Street, how this enormous task was conceived and implemented, and what were the results of the projects are the focal questions of this paper.

Walter A. Sims, throughout his campaign for mayor in 1922, stressed the importance of viaducts at Central Avenue and Pryor Street. In his message to the city council on 5 January 1925, Mayor Sims continued to advocate this policy.¹⁵ The reasons for these "Twin Viaducts," as reported by *The City Builder*, in April 1929, were as follows: relieve downtown traffic congestion; abolish two railroad grade crossings; permit trains to proceed into and out of Union Station without halting and without uncoupling; banish hazard to motorists and pedestrians; do away with railroad and public delay; remake a large area into a more attractive district; enhance property usefulness and value; link the north and south side of Atlanta; provide an improved approach to Fulton county court house and the new city hall; and open new street car routes through the city.¹¹

How Mayor Sims would get the viaducts built was another matter. The process that Mayor Sims had to follow was complex. The immediate goal was to have the Georgia legislature pass a bill authorizing the city to construct viaducts over the state owned Western and Atlantic railroad tracks. He would then need the backing of the business and property owners in the central business district. The Georgia Railway and Power Company would also have to authorize such a plan, as well as the Atlanta city council and Fulton county commissioners, and a bond issue would have to be passed by the voters so the city could raise its share of the necessary funds. [The Georgia Constitution, 1877, Article VII, Section VII, Paragraph I, stated, "Seven

per centum of the assessed value of all the taxable property and any new debts above 0.2 % of taxable property requires assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters."]¹² Most important of all were the railroads. Without the railroads' support and financial help, even with the approval and backing of all the other concerned groups, the viaducts would never be constructed.

Mayor Sims was fortunate that a precedent had been set in 1898 on how to raise revenues to construct viaducts. The first viaduct in Atlanta was built over Mitchell Street and completed in 1899. The cost was divided between the city of Atlanta and the Southern and Central of Georgia railroad companies, the latter contributing \$40,000.¹² In 1901 the Peachtree and Whitehall Street viaducts were completed. Again the City of Atlanta split the cost with the Atlanta Rapid Transit Company and the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company. The Spring Street viaduct, the most spectacular viaduct of its day, spanned 1,900 feet and cost \$1,000,000. The official grand opening was December 20, 1923, and cost the City \$750,000, with the railroads contributing the remaining \$250,000.¹⁴

These previously built viaducts, especially the Spring Street viaduct, contributed to a dramatic change in the surrounding communities. Property values in this area more than doubled. As businesses began to recognize the opportunity provided by locations along Spring Street, a variety of buildings and hotels were constructed in what was once considered a less than attractive business or residential community.¹⁴

The proposed viaducts at Central Avenue and Pryor Street were a different issue altogether. Known as the central business district, land values around Central Avenue and Pryor Street were already high by 1924. Retail and wholesale business establishments were dense in this area.¹⁴ The *Atlanta Constitution* reported on 8 July 1924 that sixty-six business and property owners petitioned the

Atlanta city council to revise its plans to build viaducts at Central Avenue and Pryor Street. Their argument was that during construction, merchants on fifteen blocks of the central business district would be unable to do business for at least two years. They also were afraid that once the viaducts were completed, street traffic would be raised above the existing entrances to their establishments. They felt that rather than facilitate access to businesses on Pryor Street and Central Avenue, the viaducts would eliminate access altogether. The petitioners recommended a revision to the original plans. Instead of constructing viaducts the petitioners wanted bridges for auto traffic built that would be several stories high. The results, the petitioners felt, would be the same except the pedestrian traffic at street level would not be affected and they could continue to do business as usual. The petition was filed without a roll call. The council refused to consider the petition and continued its current course.¹⁴

On 18 July 1923, Mayor Walter A. Sims formally proposed the construction of the viaducts at Central Avenue and Pryor Street.¹⁴ The first step in the process to construct the viaducts had to begin in the Georgia legislature because the state owned the Western and Atlantic Railroad, which it leased to the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railroad. The Georgia legislature would have to pass a bill granting the City of Atlanta the right to construct viaducts across state property (i.e., the Western and Atlantic railroad tracks). The Georgia House of Representatives passed House Resolution No. 72 before the Christmas break in 1923, to give the city the right of construct the viaducts. By July 1924, the resolution was in the Georgia Senate.¹⁹

"The railroads, which used Atlanta as a major distribution point, viewed the proposed viaducts as beneficial to their business because traffic would be routed above their means of access into the city, and two cumbersome grade crossings would be permanently eliminated."²⁰ But the

Georgia Senate did not respond as quickly on a bill to give the city a right-of-way over the Western and Atlantic railroad tracks. In a letter to W. R. Cole, the President of the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railroad, the division counsel for the railroad in Atlanta, John L. Tye, stated that the bill was tabled because the "senator from this district" believed that he could not obtain a constitutional majority. Tye then said that, in his opinion, there was some doubt that the Senate would pass a similar resolution.²¹ Thus emerged the first major hurdle to the construction of the "Twin Viaducts" for Mayor Sims and the City.

Mayor Sims, wanting the Georgia legislature to pass a bill before the end of 1925, suggested that all principal parties meet in Atlanta at the Biltmore hotel for dinner at the earliest possible time. This message was relayed to John L. Tye by Robert F. Maddox, a proponent of the viaducts, who was the ex-mayor of Atlanta (1910-1911) and ex-law partner of Mayor Sims. On a more personal note Maddox reminded Tye that "[Maddox's] bank as the owner of important properties on Pryor Street and Alabama, [was] very much interested in the construction of [the] viaducts, apart from [Maddox's] appreciation of their civic importance."²² Maddox was also a member of the executive committee of the Trust Company Division of the American Bankers Association.²²

Tye, upon receipt of Maddox's letter, sent a letter two days later to W. R. Cole, President of the N. C. & St. Louis Railroad advising him not to meet anyone at this time, reasoning that since the next session of the legislature would not convene until June 1925, a meeting would be premature. He asked Cole to wait until the city came up with some "tangible proposition . . . to what it desires our company to do." He also reminded Cole that Maddox's bank owned property on Pryor Street and therefore he had a very personal interest in the construction of the two viaducts.²²

In his letter of response to Tye, Cole stated that he too received a letter from Maddox concerning a dinner meeting in Atlanta. Cole told Tye that he disagreed with Tye about the meeting in Atlanta. Cole said, "I can see advantages in discussing this matter in advance and thus being in a position to shape the matter and forestall the crystallization by the City of some plan which would be objectionable to us." Cole went on to say that he accepted the invitation to attend the meeting from Mayor Sims, and thanked Tye for his concerns.²²

Feeling strongly about his position, Tye wrote Cole another letter. In it he advised Cole that for several years he had been meeting with city authorities and the "disposition . . . of the mayor to get these viaducts through regardless of our rights and with as little cost as possible to the city" was a major concern to Tye. Tye suggested that the city should meet with the property owners and street car company first in order to determine how the construction was to be done and what the cost to the parties involved should be. Tye also said that he had information that the street car company refused to "commit itself to any proposition," and that he was not at all certain "what the interested property holders [would] do." Claiming that the "mayor [would] do whatever will cover him with the most glory," Tye closed by admitting, "There [was] great force in your [Cole's] point and your judgment better than mine."²⁶ Tye argued his point knowing that the city could not construct the viaducts without the railroads' approval and financial help. He wanted to keep the railroads position vague in order to give the railroads more leverage when the time came to negotiate contracts with the city and state. Despite Tye's concerns, President Cole accepted Mayor Sims' invitation and attended the dinner.

On 25 March 1925, Mayor Sims had his "Let's-Go-Atlanta" dinner, as reported by the *Atlanta Constitution*. Presidents and officials of six railroads, city, state, and

county officials, civic leaders and men prominent in Atlanta's business world attended the black tie affair. According to the article all agreed that the state should pass legislation so that construction of the viaducts could begin. Contradicting the feelings Tye related to Cole in his letter dated 18 February 1925, H. M. Atkinson, chairman of the Georgia Power and Railway Company stated, "There [was] nothing in which the power company [was] more interested than in these viaducts. It will be very expensive for the street railroad company, but we are ready to go the limit."²⁶ The power and railway company saw an advantage to the viaducts. It would mean that "two unimpeded north-south arteries across the central city would be created on which streetcar tracks could be laid"²⁸ giving some relief to the traffic congestion and adding additional revenue to the railway.

While Atkinson was claiming that the street railroad company was "ready to go the limit," others were using various methods to obstruct the viaduct project. Tye was warned that a newspaper correspondent was promised free rent at the Kimball House, a prominent residential hotel, if "he [could] prevent the viaducts [from] being built."²⁸ Tye, in a confidential letter to Cole about the Kimball House matter along with the re-election of legislators in favor of the viaducts, stated:

I did not care to put in the main letter the following, which you will treat as confidential. I allowed Mr. Arnold to read your letter to Mr. Bruce so that he could acquaint the other members of the Committee with your position. Mr. Arnold told me confidentially they³⁸ were trying to raise \$10,000 as a campaign fund and were having some trouble to get this amount; he also said they were sending on the road today a prominent Georgia politician to interview various members of the Legislature and that they had the backing of the Klu [sic] Klux,

which latter organization he thought could control the Kimball House opposition. Mayor Sims is a Klu [sic] Klux and has considerable influence with this mob.³¹ He seemed to think that the prospect was now favorable.³²

The Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s was a very influential group. While support for the membership came largely from blue-collar workers, many of its leaders were high ranking officials in politics, financial institutions, churches, and education. Besides Mayor Sims, other prominent figures participated in the Klan. Carl F. Hutcheson was a lawyer and a member of the Board of Education. James O. Wood was a lawyer and a Fulton county representative. Dr. E. Fred Morris, a physician, went on the Board of Education in 1924. It was also rumored that Georgia Governor Clifford Walker, Chief Justice Richard B. Russell, Solicitor General H. A. Boykin and Judge Gus Howard of Fulton Superior Court were either members of the Klan or actively associated with it.³² The association of these prominent figures thus helped to widen the Klan's already increasing appeal, especially in the political arena. Boykin, Howard, Russell, Walker, and Wood would play key roles in getting the viaducts built.

On 31 March 1925, the General Assembly of Georgia created the Western and Atlantic Railroad Terminal Improvement Commission. The commission's duties were to devise ways and means to construct the "Twin Viaducts" without causing harm to the lease agreement between the state and the N.C. & St. Louis Railroad.³² The existing lease between the state and N. C. & St. Louis Railroad had forty-five more years until its termination.³²

On 14 July 1925, the Georgia House of Representatives passed a bill giving Atlanta the right to erect viaducts over the railroad crossings at Central Avenue and Pryor Street. Some opposition to the viaducts remained in the Senate. A

minority report by Senator P. T. Knight, of the sixth district, listed nine reasons why the viaducts should not be built. They included: that the city would be able to build a plaza over Western and Atlantic railroad property; that the plan did not preserve the interest of the state pertaining to Western and Atlantic railroad property; that the resolution did not say how much ground space was to be used; that the city would have vested ownership in easements, viaducts, bridges and other structures for any purpose that the city deemed necessary; that it was an engineering and practical impossibility to construct a viaduct or bridge over Central Avenue unless the same be a blind end bridge at one end; that it would set a precedent for giving away state land; that of the forty-four years remaining on the lease with the present lessee would put that lease in jeopardy; and finally that because the city should not have special privileges.³⁶

While Knights' minority committee felt they had justifiable grounds to reject the viaduct bill, their arguments were of no avail. On 21 July 1925, the Georgia Senate passed the viaduct bill. Senator Knight was the only opposition vote.³⁷ Governor Clifford Walker signed the resolution into law on 23 July 1925.³⁸ Mayor Sims had crossed the first hurdle.

Sims now faced a dual problem: persuading all the business and property owners in the central business district to come to agreement on the viaducts, and convincing the voters to pass a bond issue to raise the city's portion of the funding for the viaduct structures. George H. Boyton, President of the Atlanta Improvement Association, (a citizens group concerned with downtown development) had already issued a statement "opposing any viaduct plans that did not contemplate reduction of the east Hunter Street grade between Washington and Whitehall Streets."³⁹ At the same time Boyton's statement was being released, the finance committee for the city of Atlanta was "providing for

a bond commission to handle the proceeds of the proposed several issues of bonds."⁴⁰ The city was asking voters to pass an eight million dollar bond, one million of which would be used for the Central Avenue and Pryor Street viaducts. The other seven million dollars would be used for schools, waterworks, sewers, and city hall. The bond issue went before the voters on 24 March 1926, and passed easily.⁴¹ Of the five bond issues, the viaduct bond received the greatest majority of "For" votes. But in less than thirty days Atlanta found itself in court over the validation of the bond issue.

Filing a petition on 17 April 1926, the Solicitor-General of Atlanta Circuit, John A. Boykin, on behalf of the Kimball House Operating Company, a group that had leased the operation of the hotel from the original lessee, and Louis Frankel, a Pryor Street merchant, sought to prevent validation of the bond issue.⁴² They claimed that the bond was passed without two-thirds of the registered voters; that the notice for the bond election was published in the *Fulton County Daily Report*, a paper without a general circulation and with less than 1,500 subscribers; that the registration books were not closed prior to the first notice being published; that by entering into an association or partnership with the N. C. & St. Louis Railroad Company the city was in violation of the Georgia Constitution, 1877, Article VII, Section VI, Paragraph I, which stated that no municipal corporation or political division of the state could become a stockholder in any company, corporation or association, or appropriate money for, or loan its credit to any corporation, company or association; that the bond indebtedness of the Atlanta would exceed seven per centum of the assessed value of all taxable property in the city, in violation of the Georgia Constitution, 1877, Article VII, Section VII, Paragraph I; that by appointing the city clerk as registrar, and not naming a particular person, the mayor was in violation of city ordinances; because of the preceding

statement voters were not qualified or registered properly to vote; and lastly, that some 3,000 women voted illegally, which in turn made the bond election invalid.⁴³

The case was heard by Judge John D. Humphries of the Fulton County Superior Court.⁴⁴ After Judge Humphries ruled in favor of the bond issue in early May 1926, the attorneys for the Kimball House Operating Company and Louis Frankel, E. W. Maynard and Charles Bruce, threatened to take the case to the Georgia Supreme Court on the grounds that Judge Humphries did not allow them proper time to present their case. Judge Humphries granted a motion presented by Maynard and Bruce and re-scheduled a hearing for Saturday, 22 May 1926.⁴⁵ Keeping a close eye on these legal proceedings was John L. Tye.

Tye was one of the greatest assets the N. C. & St. Louis railroad had during the 1920s. John Lewis Tye was born at McDonough, Georgia, in Henry County, in March 1859. After graduating from the University of Georgia, Tye immediately entered Columbia Law School in Washington, D. C., receiving his law degree in 1879. Tye then moved to Atlanta to begin his law practice. He was admitted to the Georgia bar in 1879,⁴⁶ and on 29 January 1884, was accepted by the Georgia Supreme Court to plead cases before that institution.⁴⁷ One of the most masterful debaters and brightest legal minds of his time, Tye soon became "general counsel for the Western & Atlantic railroad company and several banks and corporations," and had "the largest corporation business of any law firm in Atlanta." His work with the state owned Western & Atlantic Railroad would be of immeasurable help to him during the 1920s with the construction of the viaducts. Nearly all of the important litigation for this railroad during the 1890s was handled by Tye, who "made a brilliant reputation at the bar by the shrewd and successful management of the cases before the court and the jury." Tye was a loyal Democrat and "steadfast in his devotion to the principles and traditions

of the party, in spite of the vicissitudes and defeats [he] remained loyal to the party organization."⁴⁸ Tye, a white Protestant male, had anti-Semitic views which were characteristic of the era especially in Georgia. Jews were viewed with disdain as were Catholics. As shall be seen below, his prejudices may have tangentially influenced his position. The most important issue of the time with upper-class white males was the economy. Greed was a definite motivation to the enterprising elite. While Mayor Walter Sims and the other factions involved in the construction of the viaducts expounded to the public the virtues of the viaducts, privately their main purpose revolved around economic factors. Profit meant reducing losses to a minimum no matter what form they were presented in, as evidenced in a letter from Tye to vice-president and general counsel Fitzgerald Hall.

In his letter Tye referred to E. W. Maynard as a "non-resident lawyer and of Macon, in behalf of the Kimball House Operating Company, the latter composed of Jews," once again tying up the bond issue in court. After a conference with the Atlanta city attorney, Tye stated that both he and the city attorney agreed that this "proceeding [was] nothing short of blackmail and filed for the purpose of getting hush money." Tye continued by claiming that John W. Grant, the owner of the Kimball House, several years before leased the Kimball House to certain lessees who in turn transferred the lease to the Kimball House Operating Company, "Receiving therefore a bonus of about fifty thousand dollars, and the lease having two or three years to run if the viaducts [were] constructed, with the right of cancellation [going to] Grant, which he [would] exercise, [made] the Kimball House Operating Company a loser in the transaction, and this [was] the reason these people [were] litigating." Tye continued by writing Solicitor-General Boykin did not single out the one million dollar viaduct issue, but asked for validation of the entire bond issue. Tye

closed by relating that his only real concern was the delay caused by this litigation.⁴⁹ One feasible reason that Boykin did not single out just the viaduct bond to validate would be that leaving it as a whole meant that if the court found the entire bond issue invalid it would mean that schools, water works, sewers, and the money for the new city hall would not be funded either. Another reason could be that the bond issue passed by a minimum of 80% of those who voted.

Judge John D. Humphries on 22 May again ruled in favor of the city bond issue. E. W. Maynard and Charles Bruce announced immediately after the ruling that they would appeal the case to the Georgia Supreme Court.⁵⁰ Before Maynard and Bruce filed their petition with the court, a compromise was worked out, as reported by the *Atlanta Constitution*. Because of the efforts by J. Lawrence McCord, a member of the bond commission, "the Finance Committee of the City Council, the Bridge Committee and the Bond Commission" agreed to pay \$25,000 and "meet certain conditions governing construction of the Central Avenue and Pryor Street viaducts." In the agreement the Kimball House Operating Company received \$25,000. Louis Frankel was guaranteed that if construction of the viaducts began before 1 July 1927, that the city would "pay his rent to that date and move him to another location without charge."⁵¹ Confirming this fact to his home office in Nashville, Tennessee, Tye told vice-president and general counsel Hall that the city, to avoid further delays, agreed to pay \$25,000 "to the Kimball House Jews."⁵²

On 24 June 1926, the attorneys for the Kimball House Operating Company, E. W. Maynard and Charles Bruce, issued a statement concerning their reasons for filing litigation. They claimed that the viaducts would have cost the company \$65,000 in lost revenue resulting in the company's bankruptcy. The attorneys apologized for having to take such actions stating that they tried all

available means to separate the viaduct bond issue and litigate that issue only, but were unsuccessful in their attempts to do so. While claiming that the \$25,000 would not offset what they projected their clients' actual losses to be, the attorneys were grateful that the matter had come to a reasonable conclusion.⁵³

With court validation of the bond issue and a settlement with the Kimball House Operating Company and Louis Frankel, bonds could now be issued to raise funds for city improvements. However, before the first bond was issued the city was back in court. The law firm of Spence & Spence filed a petition for Thomas B. Brady, former Atlantan, whose new residence was Los Angeles, who alleged that certain warehouse property of his on Central Avenue would virtually be destroyed by the viaducts.⁵⁴ In his letter to Hall, Tye said, "My opinion is that the payment by the City of Atlanta of \$25,000 to the Kimball House Jews to stop their litigation possibly invited this attack with the hope for a similar payment, as it is always the case with blackmailers, 'Maw is insatiable.'"⁵⁵

While the city of Atlanta prepared to "show cause . . . why the prayers of the plaintiff should not be granted,"⁵⁶ General Counsel Hall was advising Division Counsel Tye of another matter he wanted the city to pursue quickly. The issue in question was "a little strip [of land] south of the viaduct" which was embraced in Wall Street and would "be outside of either the upper or lower levels of the street" after completion of the viaducts. Hall referred to "an instrument" dated 14 June 1897, in which the state of Georgia gave the city of Atlanta "a permanent easement for street purposes in Wall Street." Hall was concerned that the city would end up with the property. Stating that "it will be of no use to the city," Hall warned that "we do not want to take any chances;" since the railroad was a lessee with the state it would be important that the land revert to the state.⁵⁷ The state filed for quit-claim deed for this little strip of land.

J. B. Hill (who succeeded W. R. Cole as president of the N. C. & St. Louis Railroad) wrote to J. Houston Johnston, consulting engineer, for the Georgia Public Service Commission, said, "That the State was wise in requesting this quit-claim deed." Hill went on to say that every effort, including whatever help the railroad could supply, should be taken to show "city authorities of what little value this particular strip [was] to the city" and how important it would be to the railroad if the land were under the control of the state.⁵⁸ The reason for Hill's rationale was simple. The railroad was already a lessee of the state, and if the railroad ever needed this land, access from the state would be much easier and cheaper to acquire than from the city. While the city took this matter under consideration, its main concern was the pending litigation in the District Court of the United States, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division.

On 11 August 1926, the case of Thomas B. Brady vs. the City of Atlanta (In equity, No. 408) was heard by U.S. Judge Samuel H. Sibley. The petitioner asked for an immediate injunction against the city to stop any issuance of bonds for city improvements. Judge Sibley denied the request, stating that the petitioner did not show cause.⁵⁹ Brady's attorneys then countered by filing a writ claiming that Judge Sibley "erred in refusing to grant an injunction restraining the city from selling the bonds" until the litigation was settled. Judge Sibley agreed to hear arguments "concerning documents to be submitted to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals" on 2 October 1926.⁶⁰ The Brady case reached the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth District and a decision was issued by Circuit Judges Walker, Bryan, and Foster on 12 February 1927. They concluded "that the record [did] not show that the court erred in refusing to issue the preliminary injunction prayed for. A decree to that effect [was] affirmed."⁶¹ Spence and Spence, the attorneys handling the case for Brady, added six more

clients wanting damages similar to those of Brady. Failing in their attempts in lower courts, Spence and Spence were in the process of filing a petition before the United States Supreme Court on 12 May 1927. Again the bond commission came to the rescue. A compromise was reached in early May 1927, whereupon the city would pay each complainant \$30,000 in damages.⁶² Several years of litigation was now formally ended. In the meantime other issues were being resolved.

In October, 1926, a heated argument erupted when the "contract committee of the bond commission and the bridge committee of the city council failed to agree on a plan of construction" for the viaducts. Speaking for the bond commission, J. Lawrence McCord wanted the railroads to reduce the grade of their tracks going under the viaducts by four and a half feet, claiming that under the proposal that they now had from the bridge committee (which was working with the railroads) it would be a gradual approach with minimal grading. Since, argued McCord, the cost to the city, county, and power company if the grade were lowered would be an additional \$225,000, leaving the railroads share at \$75,000, McCord felt that the railroads should honor the wishes of the city. McCord's main concern was that by not lowering the grade four and a half feet "additional damage to private property" would result. Feeling so strongly about the matter McCord stated, "The city has ten years in which to build the viaducts and [that he would] oppose any effort to construct them which failed to prevent as much property damage as possible." The bridge committee responded by saying that since several attempts to reason with the railroads had failed, the committee was sure further attempts to change their attitude would be of little avail.⁶³ This ordeal became known as "The Grade Crossing Menace." The title first took form in an editorial in the *Atlanta Journal* on 8 November 1926.⁶⁴

Tye sent Hall word of this new delay in a letter dated 9

November.⁶⁵ Hall then wrote President Hill a letter in which he suggested that Hill make a statement to the paper to "correct [the article's] inaccurate statement."⁶⁶ In essence the letter from Hall to Hill was the statement. Hall directed Hill on exactly what to say. The letter stated that the railroads had been criticized inaccurately in an editorial called, "The Grade Crossing Menace" by the *Atlanta Journal*, and that "the writer of that editorial apparently was not fully apprised of the facts." Hall continued, saying, the railroad "appreciates the desirability of the elimination of the grade crossings," but, after many meetings and numerous conferences "a plan was proposed by the constituted authorities of the City and definitely accepted by our company." The railroad was ready to begin work immediately. The delay, said Hall, was "due to the fact that the City now proposes to withdraw from the arrangement that it had agreed upon and to so change the plans as to impose a very serious additional burden upon our company." Hall reminded Hill to mention that reducing all the tracks would create difficulties and add additional expense to the operations of the railroad. In closing Hall told Hill to say that the railroad was researching this new development and it wanted to cooperate fully with all interests in Atlanta: If a new plan, agreeable to all parties could be worked out, the railroads would "gladly acquiesce therein."⁶⁷ In the interim, Hall was having another home office attorney research the railroads' financial obligations considering these new developments.

F. Slemons, a staff attorney for the N. C. & St. Louis Railroad in Nashville, Tennessee, wrote to Hall concerning the railroads' legal obligation to finance the proposed additional construction to lower the tracks. Slemons cited at least six cases nationally in which the courts found in favor of the railroads when cities or states built bridges or viaducts across leased property. Slemons' view was that neither the city of Atlanta nor the state of Georgia could hold

the railroad responsible to pay additional charges should either the city or state decide to reduce the grade less than was prescribed in the original agreement.⁶⁸ Slemons cited the last Lease Act of the Western and Atlantic Railroad (owned by the State of Georgia) section 11(b) that states:

No lease shall be executed which does not reserve to the state the power to authorize the laying out, building and construction of such ways, streets, roads, bridges or viaducts across or along the properties leased as may be deemed to be to the interest of the people of Georgia, without let or hindrance, and without liability over to the lessee by abatement of lease, money or otherwise.⁶⁹

In Slemons' opinion, the only way the state might be able to force the railroad to compensate for grade reduction would be by an act of the Georgia General Assembly. However, he reminded Hall that, "The policy of keeping upon friendliest relations with the State and with the City of Atlanta would be true economy."⁷⁰ General Counsel Hall sent Division Counsel Tye a copy of the letter and asked his opinion.

In his reply dated 16 December Tye informed Hall that in his opinion the Lease Act 11 (b) was intended to protect the state and not the railroad. Tye believed that should the railroad decide not to cooperate with the city on the new grade reduction, that the General Assembly could pass an act that would give the city the right to make the railroad "build a reasonably suitable viaduct" at the railroad's expense, "Or pay for it after it was built."⁷¹ The previous day Tye had received a "personal and confidential" letter from Hall stating that "no arrangement [had] yet been agreed upon" by President Hill. Hall informed Tye that Hill would be attending a conference "where it [was] understood in advance that the railroad [would] not be called upon to assume any financial burden in addition to what it [had]

already agreed to."⁷² On 25 June 1927, Lamartine Griffin Hardman was sworn in as the new governor of Georgia.⁷³ Mayor Sims, unable to run for another term, was succeeded by Isaac N. Ragsdale on 1 January 1927. Mayor Ragsdale in his end of the year (1927) council message stated, "The viaduct work [was] being prosecuted with energy and speed."⁷⁴ Mayor Ragsdale, on 19 November 1927, "pulled the first spike from one of the half-dozen tracks over which the Pryor street and Central avenue viaducts [were] to be constructed."⁷⁵

It is important to understand that until the city had secured all the funding necessary to construct the viaducts, agreements were being made without contracts. By law the city could not enter into a contract with anyone until it had received the money from issuing its bonds and collected the financing that Fulton county had promised. This fact was confirmed in a letter from Hall to Tye when Hall flatly stated, "At least we have done all we can do and if there [was] any delay it [was] in the city and county's financing."⁷⁶ Tentative financing of the project included: \$1,000,000 from the city; \$500,000 from Fulton county; and \$430,000 from the railroads bringing the total to \$1,930,000. Cost estimates included: actual construction \$1,325,000; purchase of real estate \$250,000; and building alterations \$350,000, leaving a balance of \$5,000. It appeared there were enough funds to begin construction. However, one snag remained. The railroads in their agreement with the city required a \$400,000 property damage fund. The fund was to be used in the event an injunction was placed on construction once it started. The railroads wanted to be assured that money for quick settlements was on reserve.⁷ Atlanta was still \$395,000 short of funds. Mayor I. N. Ragsdale called on the Georgia Power Company to contribute this amount.

Preston S. Arkwright, President of the Georgia Power Company (which also owned and operated the electric trolley lines) saw an economic advantage to contributing

\$400,000 for the construction of the viaducts. Aware of the statement made by City Attorney James L. Mayson (Mayson had cited several court decisions supporting the city's right to begin construction of the viaducts without property damage funds),⁷⁸ Arkwright believed that the railroads never the less would not contribute their financing until damage funds were in the hands of city officials. Tye seemed to think Arkwright was a bit of an egotist which he explained in a letter to General Counsel Hall. Tye said that in an article dated 8 September Arkwright took credit "for the building of [the] Whitehall Street viaduct." Tye "beg[ged] to state that this was not the case," rather "the railroad contributed several thousand dollars to this viaduct and, [his] recollection [was], the city the remainder, charging the Street Railroad Company for the privilege of laying its tracks thereon."⁷⁹ Arkwright, as all concerned parties, was looking out for the interests of the Georgia Power and Railway Company when he began negotiating with Atlanta officials.

On 27 October 1927, the city and power company representatives signed a contract whereby Atlanta would receive a \$400,000 contribution for the construction of the viaducts and the Georgia Power Company would receive the following in return: street car fares could be increased; the street car company could run electric rails over, around, and next to all viaduct structures; construction would be of sufficient strength to support the street cars; the maintenance of the viaducts and all approaches would be the sole cost of the city; and no other electric rail lines would ever be granted in the city unless they were granted to the Georgia Power Company, its successors or subsidiary companies.⁸⁰ The following day, Mayor I. N. Ragsdale received other good news.

In a letter of 28 October to the mayor, president Hill of the N. C. & St. Louis Railroad agreed to lower the grades on the rail tracks as contained in the general plans (blue prints) of 7 July 1927. Hill asked the mayor to make sure that the

state got the little piece of land on Wall Street by way of quit-claim deed. This land, said Hill, would be of no use to the city, but could "legally be questioned when the street is no longer used as a thoroughfare." Hill wrote that he would hate to hold up the construction over such a simple matter.⁸ On 22 August the Atlanta City Council and Mayor Ragsdale resolved the issue by executing a quit-claim deed to the state for the "unused strips of land on Wall Street remaining after the construction of the viaducts."⁸² This being the first occasion that the public heard about the strip of land on Wall Street quit-claimed to the state, swift replies resulted.

The law firm of Mitchell and Mitchell, representing the Flynn Realty Company, owner of the Peachtree Arcade, sent a three page letter to Ragsdale claiming that deeding the strip to the state would be "not only illegal but it [would be] against the interest of the public and of the adjacent property owners and of the railroads themselves." After expressing fears that business owners would be in worse shape than they were presently if Wall Street were narrowed any further, John Mitchell said, "It would mean that Wall Street would simply be turned into a baggage, express and mail unloading yard and gradually grow into exclusive railroad usage."⁸³ Without realizing it Mitchell summed up the railroad's purpose in having the state as property owners of Wall Street. The state filed the quit-claim on 16 November 1927 and officially became the owners of whatever property remained on Wall Street once the viaducts were completed.⁸⁴

The next day the city was again back in court. A new petition was filed in Fulton County Superior Court by R. P. Waldron. Waldron did not own a business in the central business district but filed the suit as a city tax-payer. In paragraph one of his petition he said he was filing the petition "in his own behalf, and in behalf of such other tax-payers as may hereinafter desire to join him herein by

becoming parties to this suit."⁸⁵ In the ten page petition Waldron claimed that the city had no right to contract for having the railroad tracks lowered, and that the county had offered to pay \$500,000 with the city assuming the remainder of the proposed expenditures. Neither the county nor the city had the amount appropriated in their respective treasuries, the petition claimed. Judge E. D. Thomas, of the Fulton County Superior Court, set a hearing for 22 November.⁸⁶

After hearing of the petition division counsel Tye sent a letter to general counsel Hall in Nashville. Tye said that he talked to the city attorney, Mayson, and that Mayson said that originally Judge Thomas had signed a temporary restraining order. Mayson then talked to the judge in his chambers whereupon the judge withdrew the temporary restraining order and set 22 November as the date the city should show cause. Tye told Hall that after reading the petition he did not "see much in it." To Tye it was just another "hold up" with hopes of "getting hush money." Tye claimed, "The local sentiment [was] so strong that this work should proceed immediately [he] hardly [thought] it probable that any Atlanta Judge [would] pass any order to delay the work."⁸⁷ On 22 November Judge Thomas denied Waldron the injunction.⁸⁸ Later the same day Tye sent Hall another letter.

Tye wrote Hall that the motion was "denied and refused." Tye said that if Waldron continued his case "to the Supreme Court, which [was] doubtful," that the "bridges [would] be constructed before the case [could be] decided by that court." Tye concluded, "The work [was] going 'merrily along' and between Pryor Street and Central Avenue . . . looked somewhat like a canyon."⁸⁹

There were many other minor legal aspects to the construction of the viaducts that would transpire in the following months. The N. C. & St. Louis Railroad signed a contract with the city and contributed its share of the

financing.⁹⁰ Brooks-Callaway Company, contractors, were used to lower the grades where the present railroad tracks ran into the central business district. The grade ran 6.4 feet where the Union Station was located.⁹¹ Certain areas of the central business district were closed to traffic and parking, creating a public outcry.⁹² W. F. Schultz, consulting engineer from Memphis, Tennessee⁹³ was replaced by C. C. Whittaker of Atlanta.⁹⁴ The actual construction of the viaducts started in April 1927 by the MacDougald Construction Company of Atlanta. Through all the major and minor obstacles the city confronted the construction continued.⁹

In March 1929, three years after the city bond issue had passed and six years since Mayor Walter A. Sims had formally proposed the construction, the Central Avenue and Pryor Street viaducts were finally opened to pedestrians and motorists.⁹⁶ J. Henson Tatum, executive secretary to Mayor Ragsdale, best summed up the project as follows:

Atlanta's greatest viaduct job is finished. The new Pryor Street and Central Avenue bridges, with their laterals, are open to traffic. Pent-up flow of vehicles in Peachtree, Whitehall and other principal downtown streets is greatly relieved. Like water released through a spillway, traffic has sought the viaducts. They are channels of uninterrupted flow, efficient outlets for streams of traffic that have heretofore coursed at stagnant pace through the central district.

The two viaducts and their laterals, if placed end to end, would form a bridge one mile long, lacking only 122 feet. The Pryor Street structure is 1291 feet in length; Central Avenue viaduct, 1174 feet; Hunter Street lateral connection, 914 feet; Alabama Street lateral, 776 feet; Wall Street lateral, 695 feet and elevated walkway between Whitehall Street and Pryor Street bridge, 288 feet.

Total cost of the project, including preliminary work (the railroad tracks from east of Piedmont Avenue to west of Forsyth Street had to be lowered from 5 to 6 feet) and property adjustments, is approximately \$2,225,000. The bridges were financed by proceeds from sale of bonds (issue of 1926), and contributions by Fulton County. The steam railroads and electric railway directly benefited by their erection.

Atlanta citizens voted a bond issue of \$1,000,000 for the bridges. The Georgia Power Company contributed \$400,000; county of Fulton, \$386,068; Georgia Railroad, \$230,600; and N. C. and St. Louis Railway, \$167,075. Bonds of the million-dollar issue netted a premium of \$41,624, which sum was also appropriated to the enterprise.

⁹⁷
...

The results of the viaducts at Central Avenue and Pryor Street were many and varied. Traffic flow eased and improved pedestrian safety. The Georgia Railway and Power Company placed streetcar tracks across the viaducts and increased its rates. In the next ten years the state of Georgia began losing revenues from the railroads as its passenger and freight traffic diminished. More freight was beginning to be carried by trucking companies, and, as roads improved, travelers were taking to the open highways. The central business district grew with each passing year as a direct result of the viaducts construction.⁹⁸

Most everyone has heard the old adage that "you get what you pay for." The railroads did their best to keep their portion of the financing to a minimum. They succeeded in that very nicely by contributing the least amount of money for the viaducts. It could also be said that while all of the interested parties were doing their best to maintain their own economic interests concerning the erection of the "Twin

Viaducts," ironically the railroads, who contributed the least, in the end were the big losers. In the *Atlanta Constitution*, December 1928, a story about the "Twin Viaducts" stated, that the "transformation of Atlanta, from the 'main street' classification of minor municipalities into a metropolitan center with a well proportioned business area, is to be expected as a result of what constitutes the city's most important street improvement."⁹⁹ With the completion of the viaducts a sizable area on the new ground level was made available for new businesses. Commercial access to the railroad in the central business district was cut off. The downtown area virtually lost touch with the trains. The viaducts did more than just alleviate pedestrian hazards and traffic congestion. They eliminated railroads in downtown Atlanta and transformed the area into "a prestigious place of tall office buildings," more accessible by automobile than by train.¹⁰⁰ Atlanta had become a metropolis to the detriment of the railroads which had originally given it life.

More and more citizens of Atlanta were commuting from the city where they worked to the suburbs where they lived. In the next ten years most Atlantans would not even remember that "the railroad had once been Atlanta's economic mainstay." Many citizens felt a sense of relief when the viaducts eliminated "an annoying obstruction to surface movement"¹⁰¹ and created a faster way for them to get to work or home. Atlanta was thus transformed from a 'main street' railroad yard into a metropolis catering to a new form of transportation, the automobile.

Today hundreds of thousands of people visit what was once the central business district. The new name for the area where the viaducts were first built is Underground Atlanta, and its creation, like that of the original viaducts, has brought new opportunities for the central business district in Atlanta.

NOTES

1. Bailey Williford, *Peachtree Street, Atlanta* (Athens, 1962), 135.

2. Howard L. Preston, *Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935* (Athens, 1979), 93.

3. *Ibid.*, 82.

4. Walter G. Cooper, *Official History of Fulton County* (Atlanta, 1934; reprint, Spartanburg, South Carolina, 1978), 684-687 (page references are to reprint edition).

5. Franklin M. Garrett, *Atlanta and Environs: A Chronicle of Its People and Events*, Vol. 2 (New York, 1954; reprint, Athens, 1969), 72 (page references are to reprint edition).

6. "Why Big Business Should Locate in Atlanta," *The City Builder*, III (April 1918), 16; quoted in Charles P. Garofalo, "Business Ideas In Atlanta, 1916-1935" (Ph. D. diss., Emory University, 1972), 255.

7. Preston, *Automobile Age Atlanta*, 115.

8. *Ibid.*, 116.

9. *Atlanta Constitution*, 14 March 1922.

10. Cooper, *Official History of Fulton County*, 685.

11. J. Henson Tatum, "Atlanta Gets the Viaducts," *The City Builder* (April 1929), 11.

12. Albert Berry Saye, *A Constitutional History of Georgia* (Athens, 1948), 486.

13. Garrett, *Atlanta and Environs*, 366.

14. *Ibid.*, 409.

15. Preston, *Automobile Age Atlanta*, 121.

16. *Atlanta City Directory*, 1925.

17. *Atlanta Constitution*, 8 July 1924.

18. Preston, *Automobile Age Atlanta*, 122.

19. *Atlanta Constitution*, 25 July 1924.

20. Preston, *Automobile Age Atlanta*, 122.

21. Letter, John L. Tye to W. R. Cole, 11 July 1924, Central Atlanta Progress History Files, Box 1, 1984.198, MSS 591, Atlanta History Center. (Hereafter cited as CAP File).

22. Letter, Robert F. Maddox to John L. Tye, 14 February 1925, CAP File.

23. Cooper, *Official History of Fulton County*, 670.

24. Letter, John L. Tye to W. R. Cole, 16 February 1925, CAP File.

25. Letter, W. R. Cole to John L. Tye, 17 February 1925, CAP File.

26. Letter, John L. Tye to W. R. Cole, 18 February 1925, CAP File.

27. *Atlanta Constitution*, 26 July 1925.

28. Preston, *Automobile Age Atlanta*, 122.

29. Letter, W. L. Stanley to John L. Tye, 13 April 1925, CAP File.

30. Arnold is referring to the Citizens Committee which was concerned with getting legislators elected who would vote for the viaduct bill.

31. Sims involvement in local politics ran parallel to the increasing activism of the Ku Klux Klan. The direct involvement by the Klan was a crucial part of his victory as mayor in 1923; see Kesavan Sudheendran, "Community Power Structure in Atlanta: A Study In Decision Making, 1920-1939" (Ph. D. diss., Georgia State University, 1983), 89-90.

32. Letter, John L. Tye to W. R. Cole, 15 May 1925, CAP File; Mr. Arnold, an attorney, was the chairman of the Citizens Committee. Mr. Bruce was the General Manager of the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railroad.

33. Clement Charlton Moseley, "The Political Influence of the Role of Ku Klux Klan in Georgia, 1915-1925," *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, LVII (Summer, 1973), 238-239, 242-243.

34. Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Assembly Resolution, (Commission created, 31 March 1925), CAP File.

35. *Atlanta Constitution*, 25 July 1924.

36. *Atlanta Constitution*, 16 July 1925.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Atlanta Constitution*, 24 July 1925.

39. Letter, John L. Tye to W. R. Cole, 29 October 1925, CAP File. Note: The Atlanta Improvement Association was one of the most influential citizens groups in Atlanta in the 1920s.

40. Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta City Council Meeting, (Finance Committee proposal, 15 February 1926), CAP File.

41. *Atlanta Constitution*, 25 March 1926.

42. Atlanta, Georgia. Fulton County Superior Court, (Petition, State of Georgia vs. City of Atlanta, 17 April 1926), CAP File.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Atlanta Constitution*, 23 May 1926.

45. Letter, John L. Tye to Fitzgerald Hall,
18 May 1926, CAP File.

46. *Memoirs of Georgia. Historical and
Biographical Illustrated*, 1 (Atlanta, [1895]), 947.

47. Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Supreme
Court, (Information supplied by Sheri Welch,
Clerk of the Georgia Supreme Court).

48. *Memoirs of Georgia*, 947.

49. Letter, John L. Tye to Fitzgerald Hall,
18 May 1926, CAP File.

50. *Atlanta Constitution*, 23 May 1926.

51. *Atlanta Constitution*, 22 June 1926.

52. Letter, John L. Tye to Fitzgerald Hall,
22 June 1926, CAP File.

53. *Atlanta Constitution*, 24 June 1926.

54. *Atlanta Constitution*, 29 July 1926.

55. Letter, John L. Tye to Fitzgerald Hall,
28 July 1926, CAP File.

56. *Atlanta Constitution*, 29 July 1926.

57. Letter, Fitzgerald Hall to John L. Tye,
21 July 1926, CAP File.

58. Letter, J. B. Hill to J. Houston
Johnston, 28 July 1926, CAP File.

59. *Atlanta Constitution*, 12 August
1926.

60. *Atlanta Constitution*, 28 September 1926.

61. *Atlanta Constitution*, 22 February 1927.

62. *Atlanta Constitution*, 4 May 1927.

63. *Atlanta Constitution*, 20 October 1926.

64. Letter, John L Tye to Fitzgerald Hall, 9 November 1926, CAP File.

65. *Ibid.*

66. Letter, Fitzgerald Hall to J. B. Hill, 10 November 1926, CAP File.

67. *Ibid.*

68. Letter, F. Slemons to Fitzgerald Hall, 20 October 1926, CAP File.

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Ibid.*

71. Letter, John L. Tye to Fitzgerald Hall, 16 December 1926, CAP File.

72. Letter, Fitzgerald Hall to John L. Tye, 15 December 1926, CAP File.

73. Albert B. Saye, *A Constitutional History of Georgia. 1732-1968*, 2d ed., (Athens, 1970), 480.

74. Cooper, *Official History of Fulton County*, 687.

75. *Atlanta Constitution*, 20 November 1927.

76. Letter, Fitzgerald Hall to John L. Tye, 8 September 1927, CAP File.

77. *Atlanta Constitution*, 13 September 1927.

78. *Atlanta Constitution*, 14 September 1927.

79. Letter, John L. Tye to Fitzgerald Hall, 8 September 1927, CAP File.

80. *Atlanta Constitution*, 28 October 1927.

81. Letter, J.B. Hill to I.N. Ragsdale, 28 October 1927, CAP File.

82. Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta City Council Meeting (minutes, 22 August 1927, Book 27, p. 590, line 12-14), Atlanta History Center.

83. Letter, Mitchell and Mitchell to I. N. Ragsdale, 3 November 1927, CAP File.

84. Atlanta, Georgia. Fulton County Superior Court (recorded in clerk's office 16 November 1927, Book 1104, p. 378), CAP File.

85. Atlanta, Georgia. Fulton County Superior Court (petition, R. P. Waldron vs. the City of Atlanta, 17 November 1927), CAP File.

86. *Ibid.*

87. Letter, John L. Tye to Fitzgerald Hall, 17 November 1927, CAP File.

88. *Atlanta Constitution*, 23 November 1927.

89. Letter, John L. Tye to Fitzgerald Hall, 22 November 1927, CAP File.

90. Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta City Council Meeting (minutes, 7 November 1927, Book 27, 684, line 4-8), Atlanta History Center.

91. *Atlanta Constitution*, 20 November 1927.

92. Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta City Council Meeting (minutes, 16 January 1928, Book 27, 769, line 1-9), Atlanta History Center.

93. Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta City Council Meeting (minutes, 7 November 1927, Book 27, 693, line 4 & 5), Atlanta History Center.

94. Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta City Council Meeting (minutes, 22 November 1927, Book 27, 712, line 2-5), Atlanta History Center.

95. *Atlanta Constitution*, 7 April 1928.

96. Garrett, *Atlanta and Environs*, 849.

97. *Ibid.*

98. Franklin M. Garrett, interview by
author, 14 June 1993, Atlanta, Georgia.

99. *Atlanta Constitution*, 23 December
1928.

100. Preston, *Automobile Age Atlanta*,
144.

101. *Ibid.*, 144.