

*The Personal Factor in the Negotiation
of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty*

by

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In the summer of 1850, Great Britain and the United States agreed, by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,¹ that any transit of the Central American isthmus would be jointly guaranteed and neutral. Englishmen and Americans would have equal access, and neither would fortify the vicinity of the route. The Treaty also forbade any colonization in Central America. Although Washington hoped this would eliminate existing English influence, London took it to refer to future claims, but not existing ones, such as the tenuous English protectorate of the Mosquito Indian Kingdom. This territory, on the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua, controlled the outlet of the San Juan River, which was one end of the most likely canal route.

Interpretation of the treaty was swiftly in dispute. Just three years after ratification James Buchanan called the treaty "an enigma--a Cretan labyrinth," and three years after that the British government issued a Bluebook (a collection of documents printed by order of Parliament) to justify its interpretation.² The latter publication produced a charge from John Clayton, the Secretary of State who negotiated for the United States, that Sir Henry Bulwer, the British Minister, had managed by stealth to have a document included in the U.S. archives that had not been presented in the ratification exchange. In fact, several explanatory declarations had been included, but the disputed one, if authentic, established that Clayton had accepted the British interpretation of a territorial dispute concerning the Atlantic end of the canal route. The issue was whether the Bay Islands from which that end might be controlled were dependencies of British Honduras. At least one historian believes this cloak and dagger story and has made a plausible, if circumstantial, case for it.³ Although the evidence remains circumstantial, an examination of Bulwer's activities will lend some additional credence to the charge.

Much has been written about the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.⁴ There is, however, no full explanation of why it failed to clarify the question of possessions in Central America, or why the British, who had been successfully expanding their influence in the region, would back away from that success. Although he favored Anglo-American amity and wanted trade concessions for Canada, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, was not known for yielding British advantages, and he did not much care for Americans.⁵ Although success in the Mexican War had made Central America more important to the United States, sectional difficulties were heating up and the expansionist President James K. Polk had been replaced by Zachary Taylor, who not only had little interest in imperialism but also regarded the Monroe Doctrine, often cited as blocking expansion of foreign influence in Latin America, as of limited application.⁶ In some ways, then, the

situation seemed promising for the British. It resulted, however, in the mighty empire of Queen Victoria becoming the first European state to acknowledge restrictions on its freedom of action in the New World.

Americans, although the treaty was unpopular with expansionists, have rarely seen reason to speculate about why Britain would make concessions in Central America, and Englishmen have been inclined to defend the terms.⁷ An examination of the background of Sir Henry Bulwer will suggest that he had a personal agenda and provide a basis for understanding what happened. Bulwer, a favorite of the Foreign Secretary (he was to be Palmerston's official biographer⁸), was left in almost complete control of the negotiations. It was for the British side very much his treaty.⁹

Although Sir Henry's role in the negotiations is well-known, the details of his life are not.¹⁰ His family was well-to-do gentry, and his younger brother was the very successful novelist Edward Bulwer-Lytton. Bulwer's career certainly suggested that he could be trusted to negotiate a treaty. After a stint at Cambridge, he made an expedition to Greece in 1824-25 as an agent of the London Greek Committee.¹¹ He then served in a few minor diplomatic posts and was elected to Parliament. He quickly took his stand with the most liberal of the Whigs¹² and voted for the Reform Bill of 1832, although doing so forced him to find a new seat because Lord Pembroke whose "pocket borough" he represented wanted no part of reform.¹³ Although he spent some eight years in the House of Commons, Bulwer never completely severed his connection to the diplomatic service, and in 1838 he returned to it full time. His first posting was Constantinople where, as Secretary of Embassy, he proved his abilities by his part in the negotiation of the Convention of Balta Liman.¹⁴ From the Ottoman Empire he was sent to Paris where he was *charge d'affaires* from time to time, and in 1843 he became Minister in Spain.

After some initial success in Madrid, Bulwer came to grief. French influence in Spain was strong, and Paris hoped to ensure the continuation of that state of affairs by getting the young Queen Isabella to marry a pro-French suitor. London hoped to block such a marriage, but since the strongest of the Spanish politicians were Francophiles, such a policy was unlikely of success. When the pro-French party gained power, its candidate won his suit, and Bulwer was left clearly identified with the discredited opposition. In 1848 he was expelled from the country on exaggerated, if not trumped up, charges of consorting with revolutionaries.¹⁵

The setback in Spain, since it resulted from following a policy determined by the Foreign Office, was hardly a professional disaster.¹⁶ Bulwer was, however, abnormally sensitive to any hint of failure. An insecure childhood had left him with a strong need to prove his worth. Since the family has weeded Bulwer's personal papers to eliminate virtually all private details, the impact of his childhood must be drawn from other sources and patterns of behavior. The patterns are clear, however, and as will be shown, this personal element provides the best explanation offered to date for the ambiguities in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

Bulwer's parents' marriage failed when he was a small child, and the three sons were separated: the eldest staying with the father; the youngest, his mother's favorite, went with her; and the middle boy, Henry, nobody's favorite, was farmed out to his paternal grandmother. He was cared for and inherited his grandmother's fortune but

never had the sense of security and self-esteem that parental love should impart.¹⁷ The fragment of autobiography left by Bulwer is filled with the pathos of a "solitary" childhood, including terrifying dreams and a determination not to show his discomfort.¹⁸ Bulwer's whole life was touched by these difficulties. He could never tolerate criticism and was overly eager for distinction. Throughout his career he often overplayed his own contributions as in his accounts of his negotiations of the Convention of Balta Liman and in his defense of his actions in Spain.¹⁹ His biography of Palmerston is filled with descriptions of his own activities, and he often urged his superiors to grant him honors, advancement, and ultimately a peerage. (He became Baron Dalling and Bulwer in 1871, the year of his death.)²⁰

Back in London after being asked to leave Madrid, Bulwer was bitter that with the exception of Palmerston, the Ministry seemed slow to defend him against what he regarded as attacks by Tory politicians.²¹ In reality these were little more than the typical sort of questions that any opposition party would ask in such a situation. Meanwhile, as he waited for a new posting, he married Georgiana Charlotte Mary Wellesley, daughter of the first Earl Cowley and niece of the famous Duke of Wellington on December 9, 1848. Despite some rumors to the contrary, there is evidence that this was a happy union,²² but in a telling phrase in his announcement of the nuptials to Sir Robert Peel, Bulwer offered his thanks not for introducing him to the woman of his dreams but for support in getting acquainted with the family "to which I am now about to be connected."²³ Social connection is of much importance in the British upper classes, but for Bulwer, never comfortable with his own status, marrying into such a prominent family can only have given him a new reason to prove himself worthy. It was with this background that he was sent to Washington to negotiate on trade issues--Central America was not mentioned in his instructions.²⁴ While this was not the most prestigious post in the hierarchy of English foreign service, it was certainly good enough to indicate that his superiors still thought well of him. He left eager to win new successes.

The negotiation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty has often been described, but a review of its highlights from Bulwer's perspective will show where the English negotiator compromised and agreed to concessions. These were beyond the sorts made by his predecessors, who over the last decade settled the Maine and Oregon border disputes. Bulwer faced difficulties that went beyond dealing with the Americans. He was aware that his protector, Lord Palmerston, regarded the Webster-Ashburton Treaty that settled the Maine border "an act of weakness & Pusillanimity. . . .," and considered a conciliatory policy toward America little more than an invitation to Yankee avarice.²⁵ When Secretary of State Clayton raised the issue of Central America, Bulwer was intelligent enough to realize that arranging a settlement would enhance his professional reputation. He also knew that the line between what the sometimes belligerent Palmerston would approve and the Americans would accept was narrow. Repudiation by Palmerston would be hard to take, but no coward, he undertook the negotiation.

Bulwer arrived in Washington late in 1849 to find that the British and American agents in Central America had gotten into a competition to control the best canal route. The American, Ephraim George Squier, was winning. He had gotten a treaty with Nicaragua giving a company belonging to Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt a monopoly

of the carrying trade across the country and recognizing Nicaraguan sovereignty over the Mosquito Kingdom. Clayton hastened to say that the United States would not assert any exclusive control of a canal even if the Squier-Zepeda Treaty were ratified.²⁶ Squier was less conciliatory. He followed with a Honduran Treaty giving Vanderbilt's company transit concessions in the Gulf of Fonseca and establishing U.S. domination of Tigre Island. This would provide the Americans with control of the Atlantic outlet of the canal route. To counter, the English agent, Frederick Chatfield, threatened to have the Royal Navy seize Tigre as security for unpaid debts. This prompted a letter from President Taylor promising Honduras support against any use of English military force.²⁷ Surprised, Sir Henry could only respond in general terms that England did not seek "dominions of any kind" in Central America or "commercial advantages of an exclusive nature there or elsewhere."²⁸ This was hardly an accurate statement of British policy generally, and even less so of the positions advocated by Lord Palmerston,²⁹ but it is generally the line that Bulwer followed henceforth.

Bulwer sought to buy some time by suggesting that two governments issue common instructions to their Central American agents to avoid a "a state of perpetual collision."³⁰ Squier, however, undertook a propaganda campaign to get his treaty with Nicaragua ratified. American dilatoriness and lack of treaty-making power proved difficulties for Bulwer, but Lord Palmerston was too busy with problems in Turkey, suppression of the slave trade, and the Don Pacifico Affair to be very responsive.³¹

By early January, Sir Henry was prepared to propose terms on his own initiative. These were multilateral protection of a canal, rejection of all special rights, and opening the projected facility to all countries joining in these obligations. Bulwer's ideas were close to Clayton's as far as the multilateral guarantee was concerned, but the American expected any arrangement to "get rid of the Protectorate of the Mosquito King."³² This was to prove a key issue.

The fact that the Mosquito territory included the mouth of the San Juan River led many Americans to believe that the English were trying to use the protectorate to control the canal route. Congress had asked the State Department to produce all relevant documents concerning the issue. If released, Taylor's letter and Squier's Treaty recognizing Nicaraguan claims to the Mosquito coast would produce a public debate and likely wreak havoc with the negotiations. Bulwer did not think that London would yield to American demands that the sovereignty of the "feeble government of Nicaragua" be recognized over that of its client the Mosquito King. He decided to try to settle the canal issue while being vague about Anglo-Nicaraguan territorial disputes.³³ Clayton, however, remained determined "to exclude England from the Mosquito Coast."³⁴

Early in February, Sir Henry tabled a revision of his proposal which added the phrase "not to occupy or colonize Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast or any part of Central America."³⁵ Clayton privately approved the draft, but wanted to add the phrase "or assume or exercise any dominion over the same" to the section concerning occupation of Central America.³⁶ This would have made it clearer that existing claims were to be dropped. Clayton then applied some pressure. While still insisting that the United States sought no exclusive rights, he announced that it was no longer politically possible to prevent a Senate debate of Squier's Treaty. He tried to soften this blow by

assuring Bulwer that "without a treaty binding Nicaragua, all our efforts would be fruitless."³⁷ He also asserted that if a deal with England were promptly made the Nicaraguan Treaty could be amended before ratification and that together the two treaties would have a good chance to get the bipartisan support needed for ratification by the Senate.³⁸

Feeling like Tantalus reaching for a choice morsel, Bulwer insisted that his proposal satisfied the honor of both countries. Britain had supported the Mosquitos because it seemed just at a time when the United States cared little for Nicaragua. For Washington to continue to press the Nicaraguan claims would be an act of "hostility" toward the Court of St. James's. Although willing to consider compromise, he did not think that British honor would permit outright abandonment of the protectorate to Nicaragua. Palmerston might be attending to other issues and generally take little interest in the details of trade negotiations, but British honor was another matter.³⁹

Although he again privately suggested agreement with the English position, officially Clayton delivered a virtual ultimatum. He dismissed the indigenous people as "syphilitic and leprous" and soon to be extinct "from causes which you and I perfectly understand, and especially the advance of the white man and the rum bottle."⁴⁰ He added that the British claim violated the Monroe Doctrine, and was hardly compatible with their own law which regarded native titles as mere occupancy. To press such a dubious title seemed, the American insisted, a transparent scheme to control the outlet of the only viable canal route. In the last analysis, Washington would support the Nicaraguan claim to the Mosquito territory, and unless England recognized that claim, there would be no Anglo-American canal treaty.⁴¹

Surprised at the sudden intransigence, the frustrated Bulwer wrote ". . . the Secretary of State talks each time one sees him for hours and generally talks the next time in a different strain. . . ."⁴² Both negotiators still hoped for some settlement, however, and it was arranged that Clayton's note would be read to Bulwer but not formally delivered so that discussion might continue without the pressure of an ultimatum. It was also agreed that the State Department would continue to delay sending Squier's Treaty to the Senate, though Clayton made clear that the delay would be no more than a few weeks.⁴³ A Senate debate, certain to be filled with nationalistic rhetoric and to prompt comparable responses across the Atlantic, would quite likely to derail the entire negotiation.

Then Sir Henry found some leverage. Clayton was eager to have an isthmian canal, and he believed that the chances of constructing one would be improved by the inclusion of British capital. He also hoped for French support. Bulwer was able to convince him that without an Anglo-American settlement neither of the sources of investment would be available, and he also took advantage of the rising sectional tension over slavery to suggest that if not underway quickly, the canal project could easily be lost in the turmoil of domestic politics. Faced with these considerations, Clayton became more inclined to continue seeking an acceptable compromise.⁴⁴

In early March, more than two months after the negotiations had begun, Bulwer finally received treaty-making powers from London. Although his guidance had been and would continue to be minimal, Palmerston did give his subordinate a useful tool. The

Foreign Secretary stated that Britain was prepared to add a declaration to the treaty that the Mosquito Protectorate would not be used to avoid obligations undertaken in the convention. Palmerston hoped that this phrasing would reassure Americans about English intentions of using the protectorate to assert control of the canal. Thus there would be no need to terminate the Anglo-Mosquito relationship. Bulwer put up a show of objection to the declaration asserting that a gentleman should hardly be asked to promise not to break his word in the very same document in which he gave it. He then made good use of the declaration.⁴⁵

The Americans caused one final disruption of the negotiations. On March 19, 1850, in his annual message to Congress the President denounced British aggression. The speech was followed by submission of Squier's treaty to the Senate. Having little other choice, Bulwer threatened to withdraw from the talks, only to be assured by Clayton that the United States still wanted a settlement.⁴⁶ Wary but still very desirous of a solution, Bulwer suggested that the declaration suggested by Palmerston be added to the previous terms and the treaty signed. After consulting with Taylor, Clayton agreed, but insisted on the addition of a formal statement that there was no implied recognition of the Mosquito or British claim to the disputed territory. This was absolutely necessary for ratification according to the Secretary of State.⁴⁷ Bulwer insisted that this would be tantamount to recognizing the Nicaraguan claim and accused the Americans of "breaking off" the negotiation.⁴⁸

Although he did not agree that Nicaragua's claim would be endorsed by such terms, Clayton suggested that perhaps Bulwer could just make a private statement of his opinion and retain the advantages of the canal for all concerned.⁴⁹ For the moment Bulwer would have none of this: "You say that we could agree to this disagreement, but people do not like to be publicly called liars and robbers."⁵⁰ He even hinted that continued hostility toward the protectorate could result in an increased Royal Navy presence in the Caribbean. In reality this was very unlikely, but no country with the limited naval power of the United States could completely ignore such a possibility.

Then Bulwer suggested that if Washington stated quietly that the treaty did not mean recognition of the protectorate and amended the proposed treaty with Nicaragua to the effect that the good offices of the United States would be used to help settle the dispute with Britain, he would sign. Apparently, private declarations were not so bad if other people made them. The Americans agreed to this arrangement, and the treaty was signed on April 19, 1850.⁵¹

The pact did not reach ratification before disagreement about its interpretation began. Clayton continued to insist that the State Department and all the Senators he consulted believed that the terms did not block immediate recognition of the Nicaraguan claim to the Mosquito territory. He really saw no need to amend Squier's Treaty. Bulwer began to hint that such an attitude would lessen the likelihood of British investment in a canal project and make ratification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by the Queen unlikely.⁵² Although the question was not allowed to block ratification, Clayton called the protectorate "the shadow of a name" in a letter telling the American Ambassador in London to urge Palmerston to approve the treaty.⁵³ The Foreign Secretary did approve but raised another territorial issue that almost blocked agreement at the point of exchange of

returned home in 1852 with his reputation, if anything, enhanced and continued to hold significant posts in the diplomatic service. After serving on several special commissions in Eastern Europe and the Levant, he concluded his career with a seven year tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary in Constantinople. Problems about interpretations of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty came too late to hurt him. Ambition had been served, and without serious harm to English interests.

NOTES

¹For the full text of the treaty and many documents and notes of explanation see David Hunter-Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-48), 5: 671-802.

²Buchanan to Marcy, 7 June 1853, cited in J. D. Ward, "Sir Henry Bulwer and the United States Archives," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 3 (1931): 304; Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 60 (State Papers), Cmd. 2052, 1956, "Correspondence With the United States Respecting Central America." Hereinafter Parl. Papers, 1856.

³Ward, 304-313.

⁴Significant discussion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty may be found in Ira D. Travis, *The History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Political Science Association, 1900), *passim*; Wilbur Devereaux Jones, *The American Problem in British Diplomacy, 1841-1861* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974), 77-98; Mary W. Williams, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), *passim*; R. W. Van Alstyne, "British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty," *Journal of Modern History*, 11 (June 1939): 149-83.

⁵Jones, 75-76; Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, *The Western Hemisphere: Its Influence in United States Policies to the End of World War II* (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1968), 27; Paul Hayes, *The Nineteenth Century, 1814-80* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), 372.

⁶Charles H. Brown, *Agents of Manifest Destiny* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 233-34.

⁷Jones, 77, 89; Samuel Flag Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943), 106-07.

⁸Henry Lytton Bulwer, *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston*, 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1870).

⁹R. B. Mowat, *The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States* (London: Longmans, 1925), 150-52; Alexander De Conde, *A History of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), 207; Van Alstyne, 159.

¹⁰The only 20th century biographical sketches of Bulwer are a chapter in Edmund B. D'Auvergne, *Envoys*

Extraordinary: The Romantic Careers of Some Remarkable British Representatives Abroad (London: George G. Harrap Co., 1937); Fred R. van Hartesveldt, "Henry Lytton Bulwer," in *The Biographical Dictionary of Modern British Radicals*, vol. 2, ed. by J. O. Baylen and G. N. Gossman (London: Harvester Press, 1984); Juliette Decreuse, *Henry Bulwer Lytton et Hortense Allart, d'après des documents inédits* (Paris: M. J. Minard, 1961).

¹¹H. Lytton Bulwer, *An Autumn in Greece* (London: John Ebers, 1826).

¹²Henry Lytton Bulwer, *The Lords, the Government and the Country* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1836).

¹³*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd series, 3 (19 April 1831): 1605-08; 4 (6 July 1831): 842, 844-45; 5 (29 July 1831): 520-21.

¹⁴Fred R. van Hartesveldt, "Henry Bulwer and the Convention of Balta Liman," *Proceedings and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians*, 6 (1985): 56-63.

¹⁵Although Bulwer's involvement in the Spanish marriage controversy is discussed in Ernest Jones-Parry, *The Spanish Marriages* (London: Macmillan, 1936), *passim* and to a lesser extent in Roger Bullen, "Anglo-French Rivalry and Spanish Politics, 1846-1848," *English Historical Review*, 39 (January 1974): 25-47, the only account focused particularly on Bulwer is Fred R. van Hartesveldt, "Sir Henry Bulwer: A Diplomatic Biography" (Ph.D. Diss., Auburn University, 1975), 143-75.

¹⁶*The Annual Register or a View of the History and Politics of the Year 1848* (1849), 314.

¹⁷V. A. G. R. Bulwer-Lytton, *The Life of Edward, First Lord Lytton* (London: Macmillan, 1913), 1: 6; Charles Kent, "Lord Dalling," *Morning Post*, 28 May 1872; George Cokayne, *The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom, Extant, Extinct, or Dormant*, ed. by Vicary Gibbs, New Ed. (London: St. Catherine Press, 1916), 4: 40; Edward G. E. Bulwer-Lytton, *The Life, Letters, and Literary Remains of Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., 1883), 1: 12-13, 74.

¹⁸Hortense Allart, *Memoirs de H. L. B.*, ed. by Juliette Decreuse (Houston, TX: University of Houston Press, 1963), 1-2, 4, 6, *passim*. Allart was Bulwer's mistress, and he dictated this memoir to her.

¹⁹[Henry Lytton Bulwer], "Mehemet Ali, Lord Palmerston, Russia and France," *Edinburgh Review*, 72 (January 1841): 280-83, *passim*; Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II: 249-51; Copy of Bulwer to Palmerston, 24 June 1848, in Aberdeen Papers, British Library, Additional Manuscripts, 43147, ff.455; Bulwer to Peel, 27 June 1848, Peel Papers, British Library, Additional Manuscripts, 40600, ff.310. Hereinafter B.L., Add. Mss.

²⁰Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston* (New York: E. P. Dutton Co., 1971), 516.

²¹Lieven to Aberdeen, 31 October 1848, in Ernest Jones-Parry, ed., *The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven, 1832-1854*, Camden Society 3rd Series, 42 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1939): 344; Bulwer to Hayward, 13 March 1868, in *A Selection from the Correspondence of Abraham Hayward, Q.C. from 1834 to 1884*, ed. by Henry E. Carlisle (London: John Murray, 1886), 2: 197.

²²Hayward to Lewis, 19 September 1862, in *Ibid.*, 82.

²³Bulwer to Peel, 22 November 1848, Peel Papers, B.L., Add. Mss. 40600, ff.522-23.

²⁴Instructions to Sir Henry L. Bulwer, N.D., Private Papers of Henry L. Bulwer, F.O. 800/232. Hereinafter

cited as Bulwer Papers. Palmerston to Bulwer, Nos. 2 and 3, 1 November 1849, F.O. 5/497.

²⁶Palmerston to Monteagle, 28 October 1842, cited in Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 111.

²⁶William O. Scroggs, "William Walker and the Steamship Corporation in Nicaragua," *American Historical Review*, 10 (July 1905): 793; Travis, 62; Mario Rodriguez, "The 'Prometheus' and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty," *Journal of Modern History*, 36 (September 1964): 261'-62; Crampton to Palmerston, No. 102, 26 November 1849, F.O. 5/501; Williams, 82.

²⁷Rodriguez, "The 'Prometheus' and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty," 262; Mario Rodriguez, *A Palmerstonian Diplomat in Central America: Frederick Chatfield, Esq.* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1964), 303; Hunter-Miller, 737; Crampton to Palmerston, Nos. 95 and 96, 4 November; No. 102, 26 November 1849, F.O. 5/501.

²⁸Bulwer to Clayton, Draft, 28 December 1849, Bulwer Papers, F.O. 800/232.

²⁹Hayes, 100, 223-25.

³⁰Bulwer to Clayton, 3 January 1850, Papers of John M. Clayton, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 8: 1429. Hereinafter cited as Clayton Papers.

³¹Bulwer to Palmerston, 20 January 1850, The Papers of Lord P.Jalmerston Preserved at Broadlands, GC/BU/461-2. Hereinafter cited as Broadlands Papers. The author thanks the Trustees of the Broadlands Archives and the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts for permission and assistance in the use of the Broadlands Papers. Jones, 110-15.

³²Clayton to Rives, 7 January 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1433; Bulwer to Palmerston, No. 12, 6 January 1850, F.O. 5/511.

³³Bulwer to Palmerston, No. 28, 3 February 1850, F.O. 5/511; Bulwer to Clayton, Draft, 21 January 1850, Bulwer Papers, F.O. 800/232.

³⁴Clayton to Marcy, 11 June 1853, Marcy Papers, cited in Ward, 305.

³⁵Bulwer to Clayton, Draft, 21 January 1850, Bulwer Papers, F.O. 800/232.

³⁶Clayton to Bulwer, 3 February 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1474.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸Bulwer to Palmerston, 3 February 1850, Broadlands Papers, GC/BU/463.

³⁹Bulwer to Clayton, 14 February 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1490-91; Jones, 65.

⁴⁰Clayton to Bulwer, 15 February 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1496-98. Read to Bulwer but no copy given to him.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 1497-1500.

⁴²Bulwer to Palmerston, 18 February 1850, Broadlands Papers, GC/BU/464/1.

⁴³Bulwer to Clayton, (Memorandum), 15 February 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1500; Bulwer to Palmerston, No. 31, 18 February 1850, F.O. 5/511; Clayton to Bulwer, 18 February 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1513.

⁴⁴Bulwer to Palmerston, Private, 18 February 1850, F.O. 5/511; Bulwer to Palmerston, Nos. 46 and 47, 2 March 1850, F.O. 5/512; Rives to Clayton, 21 February 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1520-21.

⁴⁵Palmerston to Bulwer, No. 24, 8 March 1850, Parl. Papers, 1856, 45; Van Alstyne, 154.

⁴⁶Bulwer to Clayton, Draft, 7 April 1850, Bulwer Papers, F.O. 800/232; Bulwer to Palmerston, Private and Confidential, 31 March 1850, F.O. 5/512; Rodriguez, "The 'Prometheus' and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty," 263; Holman Hamilton, *Zachary Taylor: Soldier in the White House* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1951), 360-61; Clayton to Bulwer, 31 March 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1574-75; Bulwer to Webster, July 1850, Bulwer Papers, F.O. 800/232.

⁴⁷Bulwer to Clayton, 27 March 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1570; Clayton to Bulwer, 7 April 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1598.

⁴⁸Bulwer to Clayton, 7 April 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1601.

⁴⁹Clayton to Bulwer, 8 April 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1603-07.

⁵⁰Bulwer to Clayton, 9 April 1850, Clayton Papers, 8: 1619.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 1618-22; Clayton to Bulwer, 19 April 1850, Clayton Papers, 9: 1650.

⁵²Clayton to Bulwer, Draft, 21 April 1850, Clayton Papers, 9: 1652; Bulwer to Clayton, 21 April 1850, Clayton Papers, 9: 1658-59.

⁵³Clayton to Lawrence, 22 April 1850, Clayton Papers, 9: 1661.

⁵⁴Parl. Papers, 1856, 60.

⁵⁵Bulwer to Palmerston, No. 66, 28 April 1850, F.O. 5/512.

⁵⁶Aberdeen to Peel, 10 October 1843, Aberdeen Papers, B.L., Add. Mss. 43063, f.18.