

PERCEPTION, STYLE, AND THEME IN THE CARTER-RAFSHOON WHITE HOUSE

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Presidential Advisor Hamilton Jordan assessed Jimmy Carter's first two months in office in March of 1977 as follows: "You are making major domestic policy decisions with tremendous political implications in a political vacuum. These decisions could jeopardize your political base and undermine the priorities of your Administration."¹ Jordan's warning foreshadowed the seemingly continuous political crisis which permeated the Carter years. As the months wore on, support for the Carter Administration deteriorated in Congress and with the American people. The President appeared inconsistent, indecisive, and ineffective. As a result of these perceptions, Jimmy Carter rapidly lost presidential power.

Richard E. Neustadt defines presidential power as the power to persuade. To persuade effectively, a president must draw upon his vantage as the head of the government, his professional reputation, and his public prestige. Perception greatly affects a president's ability to utilize these factors. In particular, public perception impacts it. When a president successfully projects the appearance of being able to influence, they increase their public support and their ability to persuade. A president's perceived style, that is their communication skills, personal public relations, and public appearance as a leader, factor into a president's ability to influence and thereby affects presidential power.²

In addition, an administration's theme affects a president's leverage to persuade. A strong, centralized theme which "packages" an Administration's goals gives both the government and the people a focused direction for the coming years. Thus, presidential power is affected by both a president's perceived style and the presence of a unifying theme, both of which were in dire need of clarification during the Carter Administration.

In June, 1978, a *New York Times*/CBS News Poll placed the President's approval rating at a mere 38 percent. To remedy the situation, Carter appointed Atlanta adman and long-time friend, Gerald Rafshoon, to the post of Assistant to the President for Communications. Describing his position as that of "image clarifier," Rafshoon's specific duties included supervision of presidential television arrangements, speech writing, and providing advance publicity for trips. Rafshoon stated: "Anyone who doesn't know Jimmy Carter, whose perception is based on the Washington media, must see him as weak, indecisive and out of touch." His job was to alter that perception. Publicly Rafshoon stated he would portray the "real" Jimmy Carter; however, the approaches he

implemented in the following months were anything but "natural" for the shirt-sleeved" President. The day before Rafshoon took office on July 1, 1978, Carter's approval rating stood lower than that of any of the preceding five presidents after their first 17 months in office. Gerald Rafshoon faced a difficult task in altering Carter's perceived style and fashioning a marketable theme for the administration.³

Rafshoon wasted no time in beginning his assault upon the Administrations' problems. In a five-paged memo to the President, Rafshoon outlined Carter's most pressing problem; perceived style:

In politics-- . . . style is everything. . . Your natural style-- low-key, soft spoken, gentleness--was perfect for 1976. People were looking for the antithesis of Richard Nixon--a non-politician. In 1980 they're looking for a leader. . . *You're going to have to start looking, talking and acting more like a leader if you're to be successful--even if it's artificial.*⁴

The memo stresses Carter's weaknesses in the three areas of perceived style: speech, relations, and appearance.

Rafshoon cited communication as Carter's major problem. He set about altering both the substance and the delivery of Carter's speeches and thus, in effect, controlled nearly all Administrative information released to the public. White House observer Andrew Glass noted the speech writers "now cook to order" with Rafshoon as the head chef. No longer were Carter's speeches boring blocks of rambling rhetoric. They became tightly orchestrated events. However, only Carter could solve his delivery problem. His lack of ability to move an audience with his words was cited as the single greatest reason under Administrative control for Carter's lack of political success. Rafshoon suggested a speech coach, an idea which Carter summarily rejected. The admn countered with reference to Senator Edward Kennedy, Carter's future rival for the Democratic nomination: "[The public doesn't] even listen to what he's saying. Nor do they listen to what you say; they only know that you say it slower and softer than Kennedy."⁵ While Rafshoon could control the substance of Carter's speeches, the President's delivery continued to be a consistent problem.

Carter's personal public relations also concerned Rafshoon. Hamilton Jordan once told a reporter: "[Carter] doesn't understand the personal element in politics." The President was perceived as distancing himself from the media and vacillating in his dealings with White House staff members. By increasing the frequency of presidential press conferences and inviting members of the media to informal breakfasts hosted by the Carters, Rafshoon smoothed long-

strained relations with much of the press. Rafshoon then advised Carter on inter-White House discipline: "[There] is only one issue on which this country is totally united: the need for you to fire some people. . . It is inconceivable that everyone you haired [sic] two and a half years ago was just the right person for the job. . . Why is this the only large organization in the world that never fires anyone?"⁶ Rafshoon cited weakness as the only explanation. For the political good of the Administration, he found it imperative that Carter dismiss someone. This stance probably led to the resignation of presidential advisor Midge Costanza who resigned after Rafshoon canceled her appearance on a talk show for not first clearing it with his office. He urged Carter to be firm in his dealings with people and to stop trying to please everyone. "People want you to act like a leader and leaders make tough decisions and stick with them even when it hurts."⁷

Most notably, Rafshoon altered the physical appearance of leadership in the Administration. In his "Style" memo, Rafshoon explained to Carter:

. . . you *don't* look like you're providing leadership . . . I hope that you won't be too proud or committed to 'just being yourself' that you won't take the relatively small, cosmetic steps necessary to convey the accurate impression of your leadership . . . I know you think it's phony and that you're fine the way you are but that pride is, by far, your greatest political danger.⁸

Rafshoon once admitted: "When Jimmy Carter follows his own instincts, he seldom makes a mistake." He introduced a barrage of changes, however, which ran contrary to Carter's own "shirt-sleeved populist" approach. Obviously, Rafshoon agreed with the media that Carter's low-key style and front porch mannerisms were somehow too nice and neighborly. His changes ranged from dress, to formalism, to a "get tough" with Congress policy all aimed at forging a new "tough" Carter image. He altered the President's wardrobe to include only dark suits, white shirts, and striped ties as light suits projected a weaker image. He also undertook actions to "re-pomp" the presidency by returning the Carter-shelved "Hail to the Chief" at ceremonies, black limousines, and neckties on Senior aides.⁹

Rafshoon also helped organize Carter's "get touch" with Congress policy. In the Fall of 1978, Carter vetoed a number of bills on inflationary grounds. With intensive lobbying by several White House aides and a minor media blitz by Rafshoon, the vetoes were sustained. Soon it became commonly known on Capitol Hill that to be politicized by a carefully coordinated media campaign was to be "Rafshooned." The sweeping changes Rafshoon made were

aimed at forging a new Carter image; a "Rafshoon" Carter image.¹⁰

Rafshoon was also responsible for articulating the overall purpose of the Administration. Aided by his deputy, Greg Schneiders, Rafshoon began consolidating the President's goals and policies into a unified administrative theme. The 1979 State of the Union address was set as the launch point for the new orientation. In a memo, Schneiders articulated the urgency of the situation: "This is the halfway point in Carter's first term. The major charges against him (in general) are that he has no clear idea of where he is leading the country and that, largely as a result of the first problem, he has failed to inspire our people."¹¹ Schneiders was adamant that the speech convey "the theme." He insisted on an uplifting tone peppered with stark, bold rhetoric. In essence, he wanted an untraditional address which would allow Carter to discuss the real political, economic, and social "State of the Union." "Getting Control," "Stability," "Need for new maturity. . .," were several objectives mentioned. The concept of "Laying 'New Foundations' for the 1980s and beyond" was finally fixed upon as the theme to consolidate the Administration's priorities and to complement the "tough" Carter image.¹²

On January 25, 1979, Jimmy Carter, dressed in dark suit, white shirt, and striped tie unveiled the Administration's goal to lay a New Foundation. As Schneiders requested, the theme was stated clearly up front and repeated throughout the speech. The press noted the change in Carter: "Jimmy Carter . . . now seems comfortable wearing the mantle of the presidency instead of his famed Cardigan sweater, a president who is enjoying the advantages of a deliberate battle plan for the first time in his Administration."¹³

After altering Carter's perceived style and constructing a new theme for the Administration, it appeared as if Rafshoon had only to make the new Carter sell. During the first crucial months of 1979, however, the "New Foundation" was shattered by forces beyond Rafshoon's control; inflation and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC).

Between June and November, 1978, Carter's public approval rating rose 14 points to 52 percent. This figure dropped dramatically over the first six months of 1979. A study of the President's approval rating and the annualized inflation rate for the first half of 1979 revealed, not surprisingly, that as the inflation rate spiraled the President's public approval rating plummeted.

FIGURE 1

Carter's approval rating vs. annualized inflation rate

MONTH	GALLUP APPROVAL (%)	ANNUALIZED INFLATION RATE (%)
November '78	52	-----
December '78	51	6.54
January '79	43	8.62
February '79	37	10.51
March '79	41	11.15
April '79	40	11.89
May '79	32	12.39
June '79	29	12.80
July '79	28	13.08

In addition, two events in the Middle East added to the tense situation: the fall of Iran and the decision by OPEC to enact a series of price increases for their crude oil. Both developments limited the amount and increased the cost of crude oil available on the world market.¹⁴

In late April, the energy crisis hit home for many people in the United States as gasoline lines began forming in California and soon spread across the Northern oil-consuming states. The public began to seriously question the government's, and particularly President Carter's, ability to lead the nation out of the growing difficulty.¹⁵

The seriousness of Carter's political plight was confirmed by a June 11, *New York Times*/CBS public opinion poll:

FIGURE 2

Margin correlation study of Carter's approval rating.

	Favorable	Unfavorable	Margin +/-
DNC survey early 1979:	54%	39%	+15
Times/CBS June 1979:	33%	45%	-12

Total margin change: -27 points.

In his comparison of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) report versus the updated *Times*/CBS poll, Patrick Caddell, a White House staff member, told Carter: "*The significance of this result cannot be over-emphasized. This result tends to suggest that frustration with the President is moving toward personal hostility as opposed to indifference or disappointment.*"¹⁶

The New Foundation was shattered. Gerald Rafshoon and Greg Schneiders found themselves in the difficult position of picking up the political pieces and attempting to counter the political harm caused by the events of the previous six months. It was imperative that an image of Carter as a true and viable leader be impressed upon the public before the damage became irreparable.

Rafshoon and Schneiders felt a hard-hitting speech rallying the nation around the energy issue was their best option. Set for July 5, the speech was to be very war-like in tone with OPEC as the clear enemy and Carter as the fight's leader. Excerpts from the fourth draft of the speech expressed this philosophy: "We are now in a decisive fight for the independence and security of our nation. The battlefield is energy . . . in a spirit of patriotism . . . we must follow-up with the speed and fervor of a nation at war . . ." ¹⁷ Insisting that only pressure from the people would force Congress to take on the oil community, Rafshoon sent a draft of the speech to the President at Camp David.¹⁸

On July 4, Carter called his advisors to inform them he was canceling the speech set for the following day. Although he gave no public explanation for the cancellation, the President addressed the subject in a diary entry dated July 4, 1979: "After Rosalynn and I read it over, I told her I couldn't deliver it, that I had already made four speeches to the nation on energy and that they had been increasingly ignored . . . I had to do something to get the attention of the news media and the public."¹⁹

Carter decided to invite a broad spectrum of people to Camp David to advise him on the failing aspects of his presidency. In essence, the President was doing what Rafshoon stated he did best; following his instincts. Carter was returning to the "just being himself" style which won him the presidency in 1976. It was widely felt that by opening the Administration to such scrutiny, the President was digging his own political grave. In addition, the failure to explain the cancellation of the July 5th speech magnified its political impact and raised more questions about Carter's decisiveness. The Chief Executive countered that he was willing to accept concern and criticism if it dramatized the importance of the crisis at hand. It was a great political gamble and it fell upon Rafshoon to see that the gamble paid off.²⁰

It was decided early on that the President would address the nation at the conclusion of the "domestic summit." As speech preparation began, the

writers found themselves divided over direction and substance. Schneiders wanted a hard straightforward speech on the energy issue, while Caddell considered restoration of public confidence in government of overriding importance. It became a question of "which Carter" to present²¹

Backing a gritty approach, Schneiders stressed his points in a memo to Rafshoon: "People don't want to hear Jimmy Carter *talk* about our problems and they certainly don't want to hear him whine about them . . . They want to perceive him as beginning to solve the problems, inspire confidence by action, and lead."²² He likened presidential speeches to rock music. No matter how many times the public heard a speech "they still wouldn't know any of the words." He stressed a tone, beat, and rhythm much like that of Franklin Roosevelt's first "fireside chat." He thought the President should be "terse," yet "positive;" recognize the serious subject matter, yet give "hope." In closing, Schneiders stated: "[Carter has] been describing--and bemoaning--the problem for three years now. It's time for action and the action better be big and bold."²³

Chris Matthews, another member of the executive team, defined Carter's unique post-summit position: "For the first time since inauguration, people will be intently interested in *what he has to say*." He suggested an aggressive ideological posture, which kept with the "Rafshoon" Carter image the Communication department had cultivated for nearly a year.²⁴

While agreeing with an aggressive tone, Pat Caddell thought the speech should include the growing problem of the nation's lack of confidence in government and itself. His essay entitled, "Of Crisis and Opportunity," addressed what he believed to be the underlying cause of Carter's lack of political success; a national crisis of confidence. He wrote: "By 2 to 1 in late 1977 people agreed you could unify the country, that now fails by about the same margin . . . more believe you to be ineffective than effective, wishy washy than decisive, not in control than in control."²⁵ He described the various signs of the confidence crisis: non-voting, the "me" generation, greed, lack of national purpose or response, decline of productivity and work, and institutional deterioration. It was Caddell's belief that waves of selfishness and personal gratification were casting aside the notions of national involvement and moral integrity. The nation had arrived at the brink of disaster "by an exhausting route in a journey filled with assassination, war unrest and deceit." When the "value/attitudinal foundation" overturned, the government, political system, and social institutions "totally failed the American people." Carter endorsed Caddell's views and a compromise was reached with Schneiders. This agreement produced a profound and effective speech which captured the attention of the press, the Congress, and the nation.²⁶

On July 15, 1979, the nation gathered to hear what ABC newsman

Frank Reynolds described as "the most eagerly awaited speech of the Carter Presidency." The Jimmy Carter presented that evening was not the "Rafshoon" Carter of the previous nine months, nor the "shirt-sleeved populist" Carter of earlier years, but a combination of both. Carter appeared direct and tough, yet seemed genuinely in touch with the problems and concerns of the American people. Dressed in a dark blue suit, white shirt with gray and blue striped tie, the President opened with a firm, yet regretful tone. He apologized for allowing his focus to become transfixed on what the isolated world of Washington thought, rather than on the Nation's hopes, dreams, and future.²⁷

While the initial tone was conciliatory, the physical nature of the speech was forceful. There was no smile as Carter emphasized: "It's clear that the true problems of our Nation are much deeper--*deeper* than the gasoline lines or energy shortage, *deeper* even than inflation or recession." He was loud and forceful, with fist clenched as he declared: "The *threat* is nearly invisible in ordinary ways. It is a *crisis of confidence*." Using broad sweeps and quick chops with his hand he stressed: "Confidence has defined our course and has served as a link between generations. We've always believed in something called progress. We've always had faith that the days of our children would be better than our own."²⁸

Caddell's "Of Crisis and Opportunity" served as a guide for the first half of the speech, often being quoted nearly verbatim. Carter addressed Caddell's signs of the confidence crisis one by one, stressing emphatically: "In a nation that was proud of *hard work, strong families, close-knit communities*, and our *faith* in God, too many of us now tend to worship *self-indulgence* and *consumption*. Human identity is no longer defined by what one *does*, but by what one *owns*."²⁹ [Emphasis added.] The speech also contained many of the elements from the canceled July 5 speech; however, the enemy was no longer OPEC, but the nation's own failing confidence in itself.³⁰

Roosevelt's "fireside chat" influence was also seen throughout the speech and felt in Carter's delivery. There was the straightforward, simple explanation of the problem, the President's apparent understanding of the people's frustrations, and the clear, easily understood outline of the government's solution to the difficulty. Roosevelt ended his 1933 address by stating: *Let us unite* in banishing fear . . . It is your problem no less than it is mine. *Together we cannot fail*. [Emphasis added].³¹ In closing the "malaise" speech as it was named by Senator Edward Kennedy, Carter emphasized: *Let us commit ourselves together* to a rebirth of the American spirit. Working *together* with our common faith *we cannot fail*. [Emphasis added].³²

The combined efforts of Rafshoon, Schneiders, and Caddell produced a Carter image which combined the hard-lined stance of the "Rafshoon" Carter image with the man of the people approach of the "shirt-sleeved populist" image.

The new coalesced style received an overwhelmingly favorable response, as reflected in a White House poll released on July 18, 1979:

FIGURE 3
Results of a post-speech White House poll

Phone Calls	Mail
Pro: 2,105 (82%)	Pro: 3,562 (75%)
Con: 462 (18%)	Con: 550 (12%)
2,567 Total	Comment: 634 (13%)
	4,746 Total ³³

These results were confirmed by an 11 percentage point rise in the President's approval rating during a five day period:

FIGURE 4
Post-speech *New York Times*/CBS News Presidential Approval Poll results

(1979)	Approve	Disapprove
June	30	50
July 11	26	56
July 16	37	45 ³⁴

In an attempt to keep the momentum building, Administration officials thought the time was right for Carter to firmly assert his leadership by making several needed changes within his Cabinet. On this, Hamilton Jordan cautioned Carter: "A White House shake-up should not be seen as the response of the Administration to our energy problems." Jordan did think, however, that such a move would strengthen the perception that Carter was "toughening up and tightening up" the Administration.³⁵

On July 17, 1979, Carter asked the entire Cabinet and White House staff for their resignations. This way he could choose the resignations he wished to accept. The result was disastrous. The following day, news of the mass

resignations, not the President's energy program, dominated the headlines. The debacle raised new doubts about the President's leadership and reinforced concerns about his competence. These perceptions were reflected in a 12 point drop in Carter's approval rating to 25 percent. Rosalynn Carter remarked: "The concept was right, but its execution was wrong, and the momentum of the speech was lost."³⁶

On August 18, 1979, Gerald Rafshoon announced he would leave the White House the following month. When asked about his departure, Rafshoon responded: "I only planned to stay a year." No one was named to succeed him.³⁷

Jimmy Carter's public approval rating made great leaps and took serious plunges during Gerald Rafshoon's tenure, hitting a high of 52 percent in November of 1978, and a low of 25 percent in July of 1979. These results reflected two aspects of perceived style's effects on presidential power.³⁸

First, the initial climb reflected the change in public perceptions of Carter as a leader. This period is marked by the emergence of the tough, firm "Rafshoon" Carter image. The formalizing of the atmosphere around Carter and the "get tough" with Congress campaign reinforced this image and created an air of leadership around the President.

Second, the dramatic plunge of early 1979 demonstrated the far-reaching impact of events and issues on perceived style and power. The increasing inflation rate and oil prices produced a two-fold effect on Carter's perceived power. The geographic nature of the energy crisis produced a stalemate on Capitol Hill which even the President's "tough" style could not break. Largely due to this stalemate, Carter's public prestige plunged as the nation seriously questioned his leadership ability. As a result, Carter's presidential power rapidly diminished.

The Rafshoon-Carter White House depicted the positive and negative effects perceived style has upon a President's ability to influence. This period demonstrated the short term effects of perceived style on presidential power and showed how perceived style, no matter how crafted or guided, can be overshadowed by the issues and events of the time.

NOTES

¹Memo, Hamilton Jordan to President Carter, 3/77 (exact date unknown), "Early Months Performance," Box 34, Hamilton Jordan's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

²Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1980); James David Barber, *The Presidential Character* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1985).

³CBS News/*New York Times* Poll, 6/27/78 "PR 15 6/1/78-12/31/78," Box PR-75, White House Central Files: Public Relations, Jimmy Carter Library; Adam Clymer, "Carter's 17-month Rating in Poll is Below That of 5 Predecessors," *New York Times*, 6/30/78, sec. A., p. 1 (LCE); Andrew Glass, "Rafshoon Move Mostly Change of His Address," *Atlanta Constitution*, 5/19/78, sec. A, p. 32; Tyrone Terry, "Time Was Ripe, Adman Recalls," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 5/18/78, sec. A, p. 26; Chester Goolrick, "Rafshoon Raps the Tappers of His Boss in White House," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 9/16/78, sec. A, p. 7; *Facts on File Yearbook 1978*, Stephen Orlofsky Managing Editor, New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1980, p. 386 C3.

⁴Memo, Jerry Rafshoon to President Carter, date unknown (believed filed in August of 1978), "Memoranda--From Jerry Rafshoon--June, July, and August, 1979," Box 28, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library. Note: for further citations, this is referred to as "Style Memo."

⁵Jim Dodson, "Gerlad Rafshoon: The Man Behind Carter's New Image," *The Atlanta Journal and Constitution Magazine*, 3-4-79, sec. A, p. 14; Rafshoon, "Style Memo.," p. 2. Quotation: Letter, Jerry Rafshoon to Greg Schneiders, "Campaign Themes Memorandum 1979," Box 24, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library. [Note: This letter is an outline for a memo to be sent to the President].

⁶Barber, *Presidential Character*, p. 533; Dodson, "Gerald Rafshoon," p. 14; Memo, Jay Beck to Jerry Rafshoon, date unknown, "PR 14-15 1/20/77-1/20/81," Box PR-75, White House Central File: Public Relations, Jimmy Carter Library. Quotation: Memo, Jerry Rafshoon to President Carter, date unknown, "Memoranda--From Jerry Rafshoon--June, July, and August 1979," Box 28, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

⁷Dodson, "Gerald Rafshoon," p. 2; Rafshoon, "Style Memo.," p. 2.

⁸Rafshoon, "Style Memo.," p. 2. (Emphasis in the original).

⁹Dodson, "Gerald Rafshoon," p. 14; Rafshoon, "Style Memo.," p. 3.

¹⁰Dodson, "Gerald Rafshoon," p. 2.

¹¹*Facts on File Yearbook 1978*, *Ibid.*, p. 386 C3. Quotation: Memo, Greg Schneiders to Jerry Rafshoon, date unknown, "[State of the Union Message, 1979] Notes: Greg Schneiders," Box 33, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

¹²Schneiders, "State of Union;" Notes, no author or date, "[State of the Union Message, 1979] Random Pages," Box 33, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

¹³Schneiders, "State of Union;" *The Public Papers of the President: Jimmy Carter, 1979*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. 121-163. Quotation: Dodson, "Gerald Rafshoon," p. 14.

¹⁴Letter, Richard Neustadt, Jr. to Stuart Eizenstat, date unknown, "PR 15," Box PR-75, White House Central File: Public Relations, Jimmy Carter Library. (The data in figure 1 is based upon data presented in an essay by a student of Richard Neustadt, Sr.. The essay was attached to this letter.); J. William Holland, "The Great Gamble: Carter, Leadership and the July 15, 1979 Energy speech" (Georgia State University History Department essay), p. 9.

¹⁵Holland, "Great Gamble," p. 9.

¹⁶Memo, Patrick Caddell to President Carter, no date, "Caddell, [Patrick] [3]," Box 33, Hamilton Jordan's Files, Jimmy Carter Library. (The data in figure 2 is based on data presented in this memo.) Quotation: Memo, Patrick Caddell to President, Carter, 6/11/79, "Caddell, [Patrick] [3]," Box 33, Hamilton Jordan's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

¹⁷Memo, Jerry Rafshoon to President Carter, 7/13/79, "[Energy Speech: Proposed Speech 7/5/79]," Box 46, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library. Quotation: 4th Draft Speech, no date, "[Energy Speech: Proposed Speech 7/5/79]," Box 46, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

¹⁸Memo, Jerry Rafshoon to President Carter, "[Energy] Campaign Issues," 4/5/79, Box 43, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library; Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*. New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1982, p. 115.

¹⁹Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 115.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 115-116; Terence Smith, "Decision by Carter to Put Off Speech Has Broad Effect," *New York Times*, 7/6/79, sec. A, p. 1 (LCE).

²¹Memo, Greg Schneiders to Jerry Rafshoon, 7/10/79, "Camp David Summit," Box 24, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library. Memo/Essay, Patrick Caddell to President Carter, date unknown, "Memoranda: President Carter 1/10/70-4/23/79 [CF, O/A 529]," Box 40, Jody Powell's Files, Jimmy Carter Library. [Note: for further citations, this is referred to as "Crisis Memo."].

²²Schneiders, "Camp David Summit," p. 1. Note: Emphasis in the original.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁴Memo, Chris Matthews to Greg Schneiders, date unknown, "Camp David Follow-up," Box 24, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library. Emphasis in the original.

²⁵Caddell, "Crisis Memo," p. 17.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 37; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 116.

²⁷ABC News Report: "The July 15, 1979, Energy Speech," Film Catalogue, Jimmy Carter Library; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United*

States: *Jimmy Carter, 1979*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. 1235-1241.

²⁸*Public Papers*, *Ibid.*, p. 1236. Emphasis added. Quotation: *Ibid.*, pp. 1235-1241. Emphasis added.; Caddell, "Crisis Memo.," p. 25.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰*Public Papers*, *Ibid.*, p. 1237; Rafshoon, "Energy Speech Proposed."

³¹"Fireside Chat" Text, "[Energy Speech] Energy Speech Proposed 7-5-79," Box 46, Gerald Rafshoon's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

³²Rosalynn Carter, *First Lady From Plains* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984), p. 303; Quotation: *Public Papers*, *Ibid.*, p. 1241.

³³Fact Sheet, no date, "Energy," Box 82, Rex Granum,s Files, Jimmy Carter Library; Harris Survey, no date, "PR 15, Box PR-75, White House Central File: Public Relations, Jimmy Carter Library. The data used in figure 3 is based on data from this fact sheet.

³⁴Fact Sheet, *Ibid.*. The data in figure 4 is based on data from this fact sheet.

³⁵Memo, Hamilton Jordan to President Carter, "Speech, President's 7-15-79," Box 37, Hamilton Jordan's Files, Jimmy Carter Library.

³⁶Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 121; Holland, "Great Gamble," p. 22.

³⁷Andrew Glass, "Rafshoon to Leave White House," *Atlanta Journal*, 4-19-79, sec. A. p. 13.

³⁸CBS News/New York *Times* Poll, date unknown, "PR 15," Box PR-75, White House Central File: Public Relations, Jimmy Carter Library.