EUROPE AFTER INF

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In December 1987 President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev signed an historic agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) - all U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles with a range of 300 to 3500 miles. As evidenced by the increased debate in both Europe and the U.S., Senate deliberations on the treaty, newspaper and journal articles and public opinion polls, NATO appears to be undergoing one of its periodic reevaluations. This paper will deal with issues surrounding that agreement and its significance for the U.S., its NATO allies and the Soviet Union.

The basic argument is that the post World War II bipolar world which led to the formation of NATO in 1949 no longer exists and the U.S. therefore needs to reassess its commitment to that dated alliance system. Likewise, the West European nations themselves need to reassert their real independence and recognize that just as any rationale for U.S. Marshall Plan Aid in the present time would be ridiculous, for the U.S. to be the major force in a European defense alliance is equally inappropriate in today's circumstances. In the 1980s the increasing importance of economic power over military force has become the dominant global reality. Japan has clearly demonstrated this, and now even the Soviet Union under Gorbachev seems to grasp this reality. Meanwhile in the 1980s the U.S. has managed to go from the largest creditor nation on earth to the largest debtor nation. That the military situation in Europe has weakened the economies of both (military) superpowers should be obvious to any observer (although the current crop of candidates for the White House seem not to have noticed). As the U.S. Representative to the NATO-Warsaw Pact Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks from 1973 to 1981 stated:

> The NATO-Warsaw Pact military confrontation in Europe has emerged as the largest peacetime military concentration in history. It now comprises over six million men in active-duty military forces on both sides, with an additional four million in organized reserves, over 200 standing ground force divisions, over 100 reserve divisions, 65,000 heavy tanks, 20,000 combat aircraft, over 2,600 naval vessels in the seas bordering Europe, and over 20,000 nuclear warheads for tactical and intermediate-range delivery systems. Adding together, the expenditures of both alliances,

the European confrontation consumes roughly two-thirds of the world's total annual trillion-dollar expenditures for armed forces.[1]

Background to INF

This is not the place to refight the Cold War or to debate again the causes and who was at fault. Historians even disagree when it started with some dating it as early as the U.S. intervention in the Russian Civil War. Certainly the alliance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during World War II was hopelessly shattered by the time of the Truman Doctrine of Containment in March 1947. The Soviet takeovers in Eastern Europe seemed to some a natural outcome of the war and to others the beginning moves of a Soviet advance through the rest of Europe. While the Marshall Plan would ultimately resuscitate the Western European economies, it provided no real security against a military attack by the Soviets. As the armies of the U.S. and Western Europe demobilized, many feared that a power vacuum was being created for Stalin.[2]

It is debatable whether the Soviet Union, exhausted by the war which had cost 20 million casualties and great destruction, was preparing to strike westward. However, as is often noted, in politics perceptions are often more important than reality when assessing threats, and Stalin's Soviet Union certainly seemed threatening. The Prague coup of February 1948 helped spur Britain, France and the Benelux nations to sign the Brussels Treaty in March 1948 creating a regional collective defense organization. This was the same day that Truman asked Congress for a peacetime military draft. On 11 June 1948 the Senate voted 64-6 for a resolution calling for "association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as effect its national security."[3]

The Vandenberg Resolution acknowledged an internationalist role for the U.S. and an American guarantee for the security of Europe. This paved the way for the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the spring of 1949, although its architects were originally thinking more in political than purely military terms. However, an exclusively Western European defensive alliance would not be sufficient because of the obvious political problem of including or rearming West Germany. Initially, NATO was to be formed by the joining of the U.S. and Canada with the Western European Union states of Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Norway was soon included because of worries about

close ties between the Soviets and Finland. Italy was included at France's insistence even though this extended the treaty's scope to the Mediterranean. Denmark and Iceland were brought in because of Greenland and the strategic significance of the northern Atlantic region. In spite of its nondemocratic status, Portugal was brought in mainly because of its mid-Atlantic Azores where the U.S. had built an airbase. That made twelve original members.[4]

NATO promised to be more than a purely military alliance, as it would assume positive goals of political and economic cooperation. In Article 2 the signatories pledged to strengthen their free institutions, promote conditions of stability and well-being and eliminate economic conflict. Article 3 called on the members to "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Article 5 contained the clause that could call the treaty into military action:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all . . .[5]

The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty 82-13 on 21 July 1949 and brought into effect America's first peacetime alliance commitments since 1800. The U.S. had intervened in two recent European wars after they had begun and now sought to deter another before any aggression occurred. Would this deterrence require the U.S. to deploy troops in Europe permanently? Asked this question by Iowa's Senator Hickenlooper, Secretary of State Dean Acheson's answer was a "clear and absolute 'no.'"[6] Dwight Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), stated that the American military presence should not last more than a decade and later, as President, warned that the U.S. would eventually be resented if it stayed too long in Europe.[7]

Because the U.S. had a nuclear monopoly at that time, it was assumed that deterrence could rest on U.S. strategic bombers with atomic bombs. Although this monopoly came to an end in late 1949, the U.S. still had a long lead over the Soviet Union. However, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 demonstrated to Europeans the possibility of limited conventional war. When Eisenhower was named the first SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander: Europe) in December 1950, Soviet ready divisions outnumbered those of the West by 10 to 1, and by early 1951 the Administration sent four more divisions to Europe to join the two already there. Greece and Turkey

joined the alliance in 1952. The decision was also made to begin the rearmament of West Germany, and by 1955 West Germany had joined NATO. It was agreed that the Federal Republic would not be allowed to manufacture atomic, biological, or chemical weapons and there would be no independent German military capability.[8]

By the mid-1950s NATO had built its conventional force capacity to the authorized level of 500,000 troops assigned to the Alliance. However, these conventional forces were still seen primarily as a "trip wire" to temporarily halt an invasion and guarantee a U.S. response. American nuclear weapons were viewed as the main deterrent if an invasion could not be immediately stopped. In 1957 came Sputnik and other evidence of improving Soviet nuclear capabilities. NATO responded by establishing stocks of nuclear warheads in Europe and providing sea-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles to SACEUR.[9]

As the Soviet ICBM capability improved in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Europeans began to question the guarantee of the American nuclear shield, i.e., would the U.S. risk losing Chicago to save Bonn? It was no secret that DeGaulle seriously doubted it, and he also resented American political-military domination of European affairs and the "invasion" of the European economy by U.S. multinationals.[10] Actually, France's disengagement from NATO's integrated military command came slowly. DeGaulle had withdrawn France's Mediterranean fleet from NATO command in 1959 and French ships from the Atlantic fleet in 1963. France began to develop its own nuclear capability, the "Force de Frappe." In March 1966 DeGaulle announced France's complete pullout from the NATO integrated command, but not from the Atlantic Alliance itself. All French land, sea and air forces assigned to NATO were withdrawn. U.S. and Canadian forces stationed in France, given the choice of leaving or submitting to French authority, departed.[11]

In 1966 "burden-sharing" became a serious Alliance issue for the first time. There were increasing demands, due to Vietnam expenditures, to offset the costs of keeping American (and British) troops in Germany. U.S. forces in Germany numbered about 240,000, contributing more than $800 million a year to West Germany's foreign-exchange balance. The British announced that they would have to recall some troops unless full foreign-exchange costs were met. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield introduced a resolution in July 1966, declaring that "a substantial reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty." U.S., Britain, and West Germany agreed

to hold discussions on costs, burden-sharing, and NATO force needs to determine whether NATO strategy could be effectively carried out with troop reductions. While Britain argued in favor, the U.S. opposed any conventional force reduction before sufficient airlift capacity to reinforce NATO in crisis was available.[12]

By 1967 the U.S. had shifted to a policy of flexible response to replace the earlier policy of massive retaliation. This caused further strains in the alliance, as many European strategists were not comfortable with a policy which presumed that there would be a period of fighting and then a negotiated settlement. Whether the fighting involved conventional or nuclear weapons, it appeared possible for both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to emerge from such a conflict relatively undamaged while Europe was devastated.[13]

When Richard Nixon assumed the Presidency in 1969, many of the post WWII assumptions of U.S. foreign policy were breaking down. The world was no longer bipolar with the emergence of additional world actors; the communist world was no longer monolithic; and the possibility therefore existed to improve relations with the Soviet Union. There was also the assumption that there was a need to reassess the security burden borne by the U.S. due to the increased economic and military power of allies. The Nixon Doctrine (or the Guam Doctrine) stated that whereas in the past the U.S. had furnished personnel and weapons (e.g., Korea and Vietnam), now the U.S. would supply only military and economic assistance to those states threatened. The states themselves would be expected to supply the manpower.[14]

The logic of the Nixon Doctrine might have been considered applicable to Western Europe. U.S. troops in Europe had averaged 300,000 for years, but several people supported Senator Mansfield's argument that a much smaller force could just as adequately defend NATO. The Administration was only able to get Congressional approval of continuing troop levels with the argument that unilateral reductions would hinder arms control negotiations. In response to increased support for the troop reduction resolution, the Nixon Administration negotiated "burden-sharing" agreements whereby the allies paid some of the costs of maintaining troops in Europe. NATO and the Warsaw Pact also began discussions in 1973 for reducing the number of troops on both sides. These "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions" (MBFR) went on for years with no real progress. There was not even agreement on how many troops each side had, much less how many to cut. There was also conflict over such issues as whether or not to count French forces as part of NATO.[15]

With the outbreak of the October 1973 Mideast War, another

rift in the NATO alliance occurred. The U.S. was frustrated by the refusal of its European allies to allow use of NATO bases to resupply Israel or to overfly their airspace. In reaction there was a majority in the Senate in favor of making the European allies compensate the U.S. for any balance-of-payments costs in maintaining American troops. The U.S. would reduce the troop level by the same percentage as any shortage in the European payments. However, as MBFR began the Senate dropped the issue. Tensions within the alliance dissipated as the Soviet-Warsaw Pact buildup in both quantity and quality of weapons became obvious.[16]

In the 1976 election candidate Carter criticized the previous Republican Administration for excessive preoccupation with East-West issues and the Soviet threat. President Carter hoped to broaden U.S. foreign policy perspectives, improve relations with the Soviets and achieve progress in both arms control and MBFR.[17] While SALT II was signed by Carter and Brezhnev, it was never ratified by the Senate for a variety of reasons. There were no breakthroughs in MBFR and, in fact, the number of U.S. military personnel deployed to NATO went from 318,000 in 1977 to 329,000 by 1981. There was also tension within NATO over whether to produce and deploy the "enhanced radiation weapon," referred to as the neutron bomb. The NATO allies were not enthusiastic about it and by 1978 Carter had decided to "defer" production of the neutron bomb.[18]

The decision to withdraw the neutron bomb made it more necessary to deal with an issue of increasing significance in the late 1970s--"Eurostrategic weapons." These are defined as missiles or planes which can deliver nuclear warheads over long distances, but not intercontinental distances. The Soviets had the "backfire" bomber and had begun deploying the SS-20 missile.[19] First deployed in 1976 the SS-20 was MIRVed with three accurate warheads per missile. It could be quickly launched and reach any target in Western Europe. NATO had no missile in this category which was now being called "long-range theater nuclear forces" (LRTNF). The U.S. did have a roughly comparable missile under development: the Pershing II. The ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) was also being developed.

Some NATO members (especially West Germany) argued for a counter to the Eurostrategic threat, while others (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands) saw no need for the GLCMs or Pershing IIs and called for arms control agreements. After much debate the NATO leaders decided on the "two-track" policy in December 1979. The "two-track" policy called for the U.S. to seek an arms control agreement with the Soviets that would make a Pershing II and GLCM deployment unnecessary. If no compromise was reached NATO would deploy the

Pershings and GLCMs.[20]

Tensions increased in the early 1980s between the U.S. and its NATO allies, and there was even talk of "divorce." The U.S. and its allies had different positions on technology transfer, relations with the Soviets, the Soviet pipeline to Europe, burden-sharing and non-NATO foreign policy issues in the Middle East and Central America. With the heightened rhetoric from the Reagan team, many Europeans began to fear that the new Administration was not just planning how to deter a nuclear war, but how to fight and win one. The old fear that the U.S. would somehow "decouple" itself from Europe and be able to survive a nuclear war was revived when Reagan spoke of the feasibility of limited war in Europe and noted that he "could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons . . . without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button."[21]

In October, 1981 Reagan announced the decision to reverse the Carter policy and to produce and deploy the neutron bomb. Since most Europeans considered this a weapon specifically designed for a European war, massive protest demonstrations erupted in many European cities including London, Paris, Bonn and Rome. The huge demonstrations slacked off only after Washington announced a new negotiation policy. In November 1981 the Reagan Administration put forward the "zero-zero" option in which the U.S. would not deploy the planned 464 GLCMs and 108 Pershing IIs if the Soviets would dismantle all of its SS-20 and older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles targeted against Western Europe.[22]

Many considered this simply a play to forestall protest and to buy time for the deployment of U.S. intermediate missiles.[23] In fact, the Soviets immediately rejected the U.S. proposal which would have resulted in dismantling Soviet missiles already in place in return for U.S. future deployments. By November 1983 the first GLCMs arrived in Britain and Italy, and Pershing IIs were deployed in West Germany. The INF negotiations had continued in Geneva in 1982 and 1983, but the Soviets walked out when the missile deployment began. The Soviets had repeatedly proposed a formula to set the level of SS-20 equal to the total of British and French strategic forces, but this was always rejected by the West. The always tricky issue of verification also presented problems.[24]

The stalemate remained until the new Soviet leader seemed to budge. By January 1986 Gorbachev had made a proposal which was essentially the "zero-zero" option. He also agreed to leave out the British and French systems and finally to some type of on-site inspections for verification purposes. For a period it seemed that Gorbachev was gaining the upper-hand as the proponent of

reasonable arms control, while the U.S. was having difficulty accepting "yes" for an answer. Reagan at the time seemed more interested in promoting S.D.I than the INF agreement. However, by the end of 1987 the INF Treaty was signed removing all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe. Senate ratification seems assured despite some conservative opposition. (By this time some Reagan hardliners such as Casper Weinberger and Richard Pearle had also resigned.)[25]

The INF Treaty marks the first time nuclear weapons have actually been reduced; previous SALT agreements simply froze the numbers. Furthermore, for the first time, an entire category of weapons will be abolished, i.e., missiles with a range of 500-5,000 kilometers. This is also the first time that Soviet concessions would be obviously greater, since they will have to dismantle more than 1,000 systems against only 316 on the American side.[26]

The American Policy

The INF treaty dismantling medium and shorter range nuclear missiles will reduce U.S. and Soviet arsenals by about four per cent. President Reagan was correct at the signing ceremony in noting that "The importance of this treaty transcends numbers."[27] The military-strategic significance of this treaty is far less than both critics and supporters of the treaty have maintained. However, the long-term political ramifications of INF should be very important.

The time is way past due for the U.S. to reassess its NATO commitment and more rationally, and fairly, square our ends and means. The argument of this paper is that we must make the decision to accomplish by the 1990s what the original architects of the NATO alliance assumed would have been done by the 1960s, i.e., turn the major portion of defense responsibility for Western Europe over to Europeans themselves as they become capable of it. This will benefit the U.S., our European allies, and the Soviet Union. Reduction of the U.S. presence will help all three parties, as this is not a zero-sum game.

The major argument against any U.S. pullout is a product of the INF treaty itself. It is commonly asserted that with the treaty the Soviets will be able to translate their conventional advantage into political or military advantage. *Human Events*, the conservative weekly, worries that Reagan is about "to give away the store" and William Buckley fears that the U.S. will eventually "lay down our arms."[28] While it is not unfair to point out that these and others are the same critics who have been warning us for several decades of the

impending Soviet march through Europe, the easy vulnerability of NATO to "nuclear blackmail," the "decoupling" of the U.S. from NATO and the "Finlandization" of Western Europe, the conventional imbalance must be addressed as a serious issue. Different figures are published, but there is agreement that the Soviets have some quantitative advantages. (See Tables 1 and 2)

TABLE 1[29]

Comparison of Selected Warsaw Pact and NATO Forces, 1986

Manpower (000)	U.S.	NATO	Total Warsaw Pact	U.S.S.R.
Total ground forces	771	2,779	2,827	1,991
Total ground forces reserves	1,057	4,603	5,080	3,500
Total ground forces deployed in Europe	217	1,858	2,704	1,868
Divisions				
Deployed in Europe in peace	6	38	90	59
Total divisions, war mobilized	33 2/3	143	181	122
Ground Force Equipment				
Main battle tanks	5,000	20,314	46,610	32,200
Artillery	670	8,974	24,035	16,300
Anti-tank guided weapons launchers	800	1,811	3,525	2,335
Surface-to-air missile launchers	164	786	5,365	4,120
Naval Units				
Attack submarines	51	183	154	148
Carriers	5	13	3	3
Cruisers	12	14	21	21
Destroyers and frigates	88	294	102	93
Naval Aircraft				
Bombers	--	37	200	200
Attack	170	277	184	150
Fighters	105	117	--	--
Land Aircraft				
Bombers	150	222	210	210
Fighters/Ground attack	444	2,158	2,216	1,565
Fighters	96	452	1,075	905
Interceptors	18	62	1,295	--

TABLE 2[30]
The Soviet Advantage in Conventional Forces

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Combat helicopters	3,700	8,000
Battletanks	19,600	52,000
Anti-tank weapon launchers	13,300	18,000
Troop divisions	90	133
Active-duty troops	2.1 million	2.3 million

A close look at the supposed Soviet conventional advantage reveals that much of that advantage can be debated, and what advantage there may be is all quantitative. In almost every area the NATO forces have a distinct qualitative edge. Most statistics which show the Warsaw Pact with more troops do not count the over 250,000 French troops. While these troops are not part of the integrated NATO command, in case of a war presumably they will not be fighting with the Soviets. British Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey, a senior NATO staffer maintains that the Western Alliance has about half a million more troops in uniform than the Warsaw Pact.[31]

The Soviets have major problems related to the questionable loyalty of their troops. For example, could the Soviets really expect Czech, Polish or East German soldiers to willingly participate in an invasion of Western Europe? While the conservative critics of INF seem to assume this loyalty, the Soviets themselves have no such illusions. It is also certain that Warsaw forces are not as well trained as NATO forces, e.g., Soviet tank gunners might fire as few as zero or as many as ten shells in a year, while U.S. tank gunners would typically fire well over a hundred shells a year. The deputy chairman of the SPD in the Western German Bundestag says the notion of a Soviet conventional advantage:

> . . . is largely a fraudulent notion. Soviet advantages are greatly exaggerated, if they exist at all. Although Warsaw Pact forces outnumber NATO forces in Europe 2,685,000 to 2,088,000, Warsaw Pact advantages do not begin to constitute the type of offense-defense ratio that is needed for a successful breakthrough. (In fact, on the central front proper,

NATO has an advantage of 1,010,000 to 998,000 troops for the Warsaw Pact.) Moreover, these figures do not include French and Spanish forces, which do not come under direct NATO command. They also ignore a number of other critical factors, including NATO's greater capacity for rapid mobilization and reinforcement, the questionable reliability of the East European Warsaw forces, the greater economic potential of the NATO countries, and the "overmanning" of Soviet forces (for example, one million soldiers are needed for the strategic rocket forces of the Soviet Union, whereas the United States employs no more than 100,000 men to perform the same task).[32]

The major argument for beginning a phased pullout of American troops from NATO is economic; as the world's largest debtor nation with staggering budget and trade deficits the U.S. can no longer afford to continue to do what Western Europe can now do for itself. There are no valid historical examples of a debtor nation leading an alliance or providing for the defense of other nations at least as prosperous (or less in debt) as itself. Figures vary, but the U.S. spends approximately $130-$160 billion a year to support NATO. By one calculation the U.S. picks up about 65 per cent of the total cost of NATO defense costs, European nations only 30 per cent and Canada five per cent.[33] In the 1980s the U.S. has averaged spending around 6.6 per cent of GNP for defense while non-U.S. NATO spent only 3.6 per cent for defense.[34]

Europe today absorbs a greater proportion of U.S. conventional forces than in 1964 before Vietnam. Over two-thirds of U.S. troops stationed abroad serve in NATO. The initial commitment to Europe of some 300,000 men came from a troop-strength level of 3.25 million. A larger NATO contingent today comes from an overall force almost a third smaller. Today some 25 per cent of NATO's 20,000 tanks are American; ten years ago it was approximately 20 per cent.[35]

In the 1980s economic power has become as important as pure military power in a nation's global position. As economic power has been increasingly important to a nation's international influence, the U.S. economic position and its productive base has eroded. Part of the reason (although obviously not all) that the U.S. economic position has deteriorated is due to the continued economic drain that our NATO commitment imposes. Neither political party or its candidates

have addressed the critical relationship between our deteriorating economic position and U.S. foreign policy. Our allies seem more aware of the reality of economic power in the current international situation than we do. For example, Western Europe and Japan had $40 billion worth of trade with the Soviet bloc in 1984 compared to our 2.3 billion.[36] It no longer makes sense for the U.S. to subsidize the defense of nations as prosperous as ourselves, who have also established very extensive political and economic relations with the very nation the U.S. is supposed to be defending them against.

The argument is sometimes made that the NATO allies are in fact paying their "fair share" of defense costs; the Defense Department often claims this.[37] This position, no matter what figures are used, should not be persuasive. The bottom line is that it is Europe being defended. What kind of argument is it that says the West Europeans are paying "almost" as much as the U.S. for their defense?

It must also be noted that just as Western Europe needs us less today in a military sense, we also need them less than in 1949 in purely military terms. In the late 1940s and 1950s the Europeans controlled overseas territory vital to U.S. security for both bases and raw materials. For example, the British in the Persian Gulf safeguarded Middle Eastern oil and the Dutch controlled areas such as Indonesia with valuable raw materials. Most of the European colonial outposts are now gone.

Equally important, other areas have become vitally crucial to U.S. policy. Northeast Asia including Japan and China, the Persian Gulf, and Central America are now seen as crucial to U.S. geopolitical interests, and yet they receive nowhere near the resources devoted to Europe.

It must also be remembered that in the 1950s and even early 1960s the U.S. needed European bases in order to conduct any military operations, especially nuclear operations, against the Soviet Union's military industrial heartland. We also depended on European bases for intelligence-gathering. Almost all of this is obsolete and unnecessary today with the development of intercontinental bombers, land and sea-based ICBMs, and the increasing use of satellites for intelligence-gathering.[38]

West European Policy

Just as we need Europe less than several decades ago and are less able to subsidize their defense, Europe needs the U.S. less today (in the military sense) and is much better able to pay for her own

security. Large deployments of U.S. troops in Europe were supposed to be temporary until the Europeans were back on their feet. Six months after the NATO treaty was signed, DeGaulle said: "France must first count upon itself, independent of foreign aid," and NATO "takes away the initiative to build our national defense."[39] In 1963, Eisenhower complained:

> When I went back to Europe in 1951, to command the forces of NATO the U.S. agreed to supply the equivalent of six infantry divisions which were to be regarded as an emergency reinforcement of Europe while our hard-hit allies were building their economies and capabilities for supporting defense. Now, 12 years later, these forces, somewhat reinforced are still there.[40]

One still hears the assertion that without a massive U.S. presence Europe would become "finlandized" or accommodationist. It appears less than credible that the only thing preventing West European acceptance of Soviet dominance is U.S. troops. Actually, of all the NATO allies France is the least dependent on the U.S. military and is also the least accommodationist toward the Soviet Union. West Germany, in contrast, is the most dependent on the United States and is the most accommodationist. Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a NATO supporter in the 1960s and 1970s has now concluded that:

> Dependency corrupts and corrupts not only the independent partners, but also the oversized partner who is making decisions almost single-handedly. Most of the European governments rely too much on American nuclear weapons and most of them neglect their own conventional defense. An improved military equilibrium requires that the military equipment of the French reserve troops be increased. It also required more British reserve troops. We need to strengthen the conventional usable German air force and to provide more conventional munitions for the German army. Under such qualitatively and quantitatively improved conditions, a partial withdrawal of American troops would not necessarily be a misfortune. The Europeans would be playing a role of their own.[41]

The Soviet Position

It is not the purpose of this paper to make suggestions for Soviet policy. However, it is obvious that any major redeployment of U.S. troops out of NATO will depend somewhat on perceptions about Gorbachev and his intentions. Is Gorbachev a change from the past or no different than his predecessors? Every indication in his short tenure in office indicates he represents entirely new thinking. As Christopher Bertram observed:

> Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader to talk of 'common security' (unlike Stalin), to abstain from saber-rattling and dramatic Third World adventure (unlike Khruschchev) and to emphasize the Soviet need for international stability as a function of his desire to promote domestic reform at home (unlike Brezhnev). Indeed, if the statements made by the general secretary were to come to reflect a committed, sustained policy, this would be the kind of attitude that the West has always sought. . .[42]

One has to give primary credit for the INF treaty to this new Soviet leader. Certainly Brezhnev would never have accepted it. Had the situation been reversed, Reagan would never have accepted it. That is, if the U.S. were pulling out many more nuclear missiles than the Soviets and two Soviet Allies (e.g., Bulgaria and Poland) were alone retaining intermediate nuclear weapons, Reagan would never have considered it. It might be also noted that what was probably a ploy by the U.S. (the proposal for on site inspections) has not only been accepted by Gorbachev, but also it is the U.S. which is expressing reservations here.

Gorbachev seems far more aware than U.S. leadership (of either party) that both superpowers must curtail their bloated defense expenditures to save their economies. In his remarkable book *Perestroika*, Gorbachev speaks of Europe as a "common European home" and says: "We resent the belief that Europe is doomed to confrontation between blocs and to a continued preparation for war against each other."[43]

Much more than any past Soviet leader, Gorbachev seems to recognize the decreasing military utility of nuclear weapons, and he is also aware that the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe is

hurting his efforts at reform--economic and otherwise. His basic prescription for the problem is certainly as rational as any of the tired rhetoric from our leaders and his call in Europe for "a drastic reduction of the armed forces and conventional weapons" should be pursued. Gorbachev recognizes that there are problems of parity and equality to be dealt with, but in contrast to our basic position maintains: "We stand for eliminating the inequality existing in some areas, but not through a buildup by those who lag behind through a reduction by those who are ahead."[44]

Conclusion

There is no longer any justification for a massive American conventional presence in Western Europe. None of the arguments make sense in 1988 due to our inability to afford it, the ability of the states directly concerned to afford it, and a changed security situation. If there is a Soviet conventional advantage, it is exaggerated and totally irrelevant. Even after the INF treaty is implemented, NATO will still have British and French nuclear weapons, as well as thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, U.S. SLBMs in the area assigned to SACEUR and ultimately ICBMs in the U.S. itself. There would be no rational Soviet expectation of victory, or even survival, in an attack on NATO. If U.S. forces are in the area only as a "tripwire," 50,000 U.S. troops could serve that function as well as 325,000.

The policy we should follow after INF is not to build up conventional forces. These huge military expenditures have actually weakened our security position. There is no good argument to further weaken our position with increased expenditures. In fact, if the policy followed after INF is to be an increase in conventional expenditures, the thesis of this paper would be to vote against INF as too costly.

NOTES

[1]Jonathan Dean, Military Security in Europe," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1987), p. 22.

[2]See Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1984).

[3]James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., *American Foreign Policy: FDR to Reagan* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 72.

[4]Timothy Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981).

[5]Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p. 73.

[6]Ibid., p. 74.

[7]Christopher Layne, "Atlanticism Without NATO," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1987), p. 30.

[8]Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 115-17.

[9]Ibid., pp. 120-21.

[10]See Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

[11]Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 209-11.

[12]Ibid., pp. 215-19.

[13]Richard Smoke, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma* (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 192-95.

[14]See Richard Nixon, *R.N.: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 487-88.

[15]Smoke, pp. 195-96.

[16]Ibid.

[17]See Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982).

[18]Ibid., pp. 225-29.

[19]Daniel S. Papp, *Contemporary International Relations* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1988), p. 275.

[20]Smoke, pp. 197-200.

[21]Ibid., p. 232.

[22]Helmut Schmidt, "The Zero Option--A Western Idea," *World Press Review* (July 1987), p. 28. See also *Wall Street Journal* (26 October 1987), editorial p. 26.

[23]Bertram, p. 949.

[24]Smoke, pp. 235-40.

[25]*Newsweek*, 14 December 1987, p. 24.

[26]Werner Kaltefleiter, "The INF Treaty--Will It Reduce the Danger of War?" *The World and I* (March 1988), p. 137.

[27]*Atlanta Constitution* (9 December 1987), p. 1.

[28]Quoted in James J. Kilpatrick column, *Atlanta Journal and Constitution* (13 December 1987), p. 3C.

[29]Table reproduced from Papp, p. 277.

[30]*Atlanta Journal and Constitution* (29 November 1987), p. 1K.

[31]David Evans, "Facts Deal Fatal Blow to the Image of 10-foot-tall Soviet Soldier," *Atlanta Constitution* (2 December 1987), p. 19.

[32]Horst Ehmke, "Double-Zero and Beyond," *World Policy Journal* (Summer 1987), p. 376.

[33]Archibald L. Gillies, et al, *Post-Reagan America* (New York: World Policy Institute, 1987), p. 64.

[34]Melvyn Krauss, "U.S. Troops in Europe," *The World and I* (July 1987), pp. 134-35.

[35]Eliot A. Cohen, "Do We Still Need Europe," in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.) *At Issue: Politics in the World Arena* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 244-49.

[36]Gillies, pp. 66-67.

[37]See *Atlanta Constitution* (29 March 1988), p. 15 for study by the Defense Budget Project.

[38]Cohen, pp. 239-46.

[39]Krauss, p. 135.

[40]Ibid., p. 132.

[41]Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1988), p. 793.

[42]Bertram, pp. 944-45.

[43]Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 195.

[44]Ibid., p. 203.