

"1984" -- WHAT IS IT? POPULAR AND SCHOLARLY  
VIEWS OF TOTALITARIAN RULE

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Newspaper and television columnist Andy Rooney recently wrote, "The idea of the year 1984 doesn't do much to me. It isn't any special kind of number. It's just your average, everyday year. If it hadn't been for George Orwell, I'd hardly have noticed it was coming."<sup>1</sup> The past year, Orwell's book, 1984, seems to have been everywhere, cited by everyone, and misused by most.

The mark of a totalitarian government, Orwell had warned in his novel, was its ability to twist and distort the truth through language, so that words become meaningless and used merely for controlling the minds of the masses. Our magazines, newspapers, broadcasters, industrial corporations, and even professors, by mythologizing Orwell and using his 1984 to make whatever point they wish, have set high standards in the linguistic sloppiness he deplored.<sup>2</sup>

Pessimists and professional doomsters have especially used 1984 to prophesy the demise of American life. Public opinion polls indicate that the percentage of Americans who said they were "very concerned" about threats to personal privacy had increased from 31 percent in 1978 to 48 percent in 1983. Not all Americans, however, are so fearful. Orwell's novel inspired on New Year's day a flight near Boston by a young man who fastened himself to 57 helium-filled balloons and soared one mile into the sky. Said the twenty-four-year-old balloonist about his adventure, "It was a statement about Orwell's book, saying that life is not as dismal as he said and we hope things don't get that way."<sup>3</sup>

There is, in short, not much that has not already been said about Mr. Orwell. But that is what is intriguing about 1984: its unmatched and enduring appeal in the United States, despite its British author and setting. Tens of millions worldwide have read the book, in 62 languages, since it was published three decades ago. But nowhere has the work been more popular than in America. In January it was the New York Times' best seller, ranking two spots higher than the third place it achieved on the list in 1949.<sup>4</sup>

1984 has had a special charm for professors of history; we have made the novel assigned reading for countless sections of western civilization and other classes. Novels have long held a fascination for the historian, particularly as a form of historical evidence and because the historian and novelist deal in the same mediums of prose and narration. But we have been drawn to 1984 for other, more substantial reasons. One was Orwell's view of history; in 1984 he identified the study of the past as a mechanism for propaganda and a potential menace to freedom. For Orwell, as for Voltaire, history could become "a parcel of tricks we play on the dead" -- and, one could add, on the living. In the novel, 1984, historians were fully employed shamelessly, disastrously, and in total betrayal of their profession. The main character, Winston Smith, was a minor bureaucrat whose job was rewriting history for the Ministry of Truth in his totalitarian state of Oceania, so that the past conformed to the current party ideology.

For Orwell, who witnessed firsthand in the Spanish Civil War this technique of altering facts to suit policy, with no regard for the truth, a society that had lost its history was beyond contempt. In 1984, Winston was told: "The past is whatever the records and the memories agree upon. And since the Party is in full control of all records, and in equally full command of the minds of its members, it follows that the past is whatever the Party chooses to make it."<sup>5</sup>

1984 has appealed so widely, moreover, because in politics it is what the reader, both American and non-American, wishes it to be. A Soviet newspaper in the Ukraine described the book once:

Recently the American [sic] writer George Orwell wrote a novel depicting America in 1984. He predicted that by that time the private lives of Americans will be investigated by means of secretly installed television screens. . . His fantasy does not foretell happenings, but lags behind 'the American way of life.' The boldest predictions of Orwell for 1984 are, so to speak, fulfilled and overfulfilled in the United States today. . . . There are millions and tens of millions of innocent people who are victims of the notorious House Un-American Activities Committee.<sup>6</sup>

Americans, on the other hand, have embraced 1984 so enthusiastically because it has reflected and reinforced their image of totalitarian dictatorship, and particularly of Soviet Russia, which they have accepted since the 1930s. Though Americans appear most disturbed today by the relentless electronic surveillance in the novel, 1984 is not about technology, but about politics. The image of the totalitarian state set forth by Orwell was that of a dictatorship whose citizens (disparagingly called "proles") suffered dehumanization through propaganda and terror and played no role in politics. "Big Brother," as Orwell called the totalitarian state he described, was ruled by the all-powerful party and was an aggressive state, determined to expand its power abroad through endless war. When, at the close of the novel, Winston Smith was defeated in his rebellion against the regime, the closing lines expressed his bitter failure by noting, "He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother." The reader is left with the impression that "Big Brother" could only be changed if it was destroyed, and that it could only be destroyed from without.

This view of totalitarianism, however, was not Orwell's invention; the image had been popular in the United States since the 1930s to describe Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. The heart of the concept was that the conditions inside Germany and Russia, and particularly the terror, persecution, propaganda, and other bureaucratic methods used to rule the people, made Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism the same. Moreover, the apparent ability of each regime to possess an absolute empire over the minds of its helpless masses seemed to dictate that Nazism (i.e. fascism) and Communism would automatically seek to eliminate the threat of freedom elsewhere by pursuing an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy. According to the totalitarian theory, no

change was possible in the nature of such states, and they could therefore never relinquish their combative posture toward democratic societies.

For several decades American political leaders and public opinion have accepted this image of totalitarianism. Presidents have used it often to justify refusing to negotiate with the Russians and instead engaging in an arms race with and following a hard line against the Soviet Union. The totalitarian concept, which Orwell's 1984 did so much to popularize, has formed the heart of American "cold war" ideology. But what is more significant than identifying the theory is recognizing that it has rested on inaccurate or, in the least, questionable assumptions that have been made about Nazi and Soviet rule.

Especially dubious has been the supposition that Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism was the same. What intensified the analogy were the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 and the Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe at the end of World War II. Collier's magazine, responding to the Nazi-Soviet agreement, thanked Hitler and Stalin for "dropping the pretense of hating each other's gizzards" and for removing "all doubt, except in the minds of incurable dreamers, that there is any real difference between Communism and Fascism." Such attitudes changed only slightly when the Germans invaded Russia in June 1941 and the United States and Britain eventually allied with the Soviet Union. The Wall Street Journal commented on the massive Nazi invasion of Russia that "the American people know the principal difference between Mr. Hitler and Mr. Stalin is the size of their respective mustaches."<sup>7</sup>

But the most significant and misleading part of the Communist-fascist analogy was that drawn between the post-World War II Soviet military actions and those of prewar and wartime Germany. As the Soviet armies marched into Eastern Europe on the heels of the defeated Nazis, many Americans saw the Russian move as pure aggression. It was assumed that Russia was merely replacing Germany as the disrupter of peace in Europe. Little thought was given to understanding the incredible suffering of the Russians, Poles, Czechs, and especially the Jews in Eastern Europe who died by the millions in Nazi death camps and before SS firing squads. Viewed in that context, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe was an act of wartime liberation and the result of Soviet concerns about their future security.

But the Russians were vehemently condemned, and the Soviet-American confrontation called the "cold war" unfolded. Americans viewed the Russian move as a replay of Hitler's aggression in the 1930s. H.V. Kaltenborn, the broadcaster, shortly after Winston Churchill's iron curtain speech in 1946, labelled the Soviet Union "a ruthless, totalitarian power which is seeking domination in both Europe and Asia," and he warned his radio listeners to "Remember Munich!" In May 1947, President Truman remarked, "There isn't any difference in totalitarian states. I don't care what you call them, Nazi, Communist, or Fascist. . . ."<sup>8</sup>

Another issue ignored in the emotional and simplistic Nazi-Communist analogy was the history of Russia's diplomatic efforts during the 1930s, which were rebuffed by the Western powers, to form an anti-Nazi coalition and a security agreement for Eastern Europe. Furthermore, in the fear and anti-Communist hysteria which swept the United States after



World War II, Americans were unable to appreciate the dramatic differences between Communist and Nazi ideology. No distinction, for example, was made by the Truman government between the Soviet system, which proclaimed a humanistic ideology (Marxism) and failed to live up to its ideal, and Hitler's Germany, which tragically lived up to its anti-humanistic philosophy of racism and militarism (Nazism) only too well.

Nor did the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the 1960s distinguish between the Soviet support of revolutionary and anti-colonial movements abroad, whose rebellions aimed at the social and economic improvement of disadvantaged peoples, and the Nazi military invasion of much of Europe and Russia, which was not designed to improve mankind, but exterminate that part Hitler disliked. Because Kennedy and Johnson failed to make such distinctions, they accepted the old totalitarian theory of an "international Communist conspiracy" at work in the revolutions in Cuba and Vietnam, they demanded that the Russians not be "appeased" as Hitler had been in the 1930s, and they escalated the nationalist struggle for independence in Vietnam into a major confrontation with the Soviet Union and China.<sup>9</sup>

The simplistic Nazi-Communist analogy has also been, alas, fostered by American education; professors and high school teachers have tended to accept the "cold war" image of totalitarianism. Hannah Arendt, in her widely praised study published in 1951, The Origins of Totalitarianism, stressed the similarities in the Nazi and Soviet regimes and failed even to note the glaring ideological differences between them. Senior Scholastic magazine in the 1960s taught that Communism and fascism were essentially the same political animal. Zbigniew Brzezinski, before he became President Carter's National Security advisor in 1977, was one of America's premier Soviet specialists who accepted the traditional totalitarian image of Russia.<sup>10</sup> Even today, the Nazi-Communist analogy is encouraged in western civilization textbooks used in college history survey classes. To my knowledge, only one of the leading texts concedes that some historians "consider the differences between those regimes more important than their similarities."<sup>11</sup>

Beyond the Nazi-Communist comparison, there are other problems with the "cold war" concept of totalitarianism. The theory stresses that because German and Russian totalitarianism so victimized its helpless populations (the "proles," in Orwell's words), such regimes automatically seek to destroy the threat posed by freedom elsewhere by pursuing a policy of world conquest. Consequently, according to the totalitarian argument, no change is possible in such political systems. They can never give up their life and death struggle against democratic societies.

These are especially the views which the Reagan administration has adopted to justify massive defense budgets and to mobilize American force in the Middle East and Latin America. For example, in rejecting calls for negotiations with the Soviets for a "nuclear freeze," the President told Protestant preachers in a speech in Orlando in March 1983:

During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that as good Marxists-Leninists the



Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognized is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. . . .

I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s; we see it too often today. . . .

Let us pray for salvation of all those who live in totalitarian darkness, pray they will discover the job of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples of the earth--they are the focus of evil in the modern world.<sup>12</sup>

In May 1981, the President told the graduates of West Point that since World War II the Soviet Union had been "creating a society in which everything that isn't compulsory is prohibited. The citizens of that society have little more to say about their government than a prison inmate has to say about the prison administration."<sup>13</sup>

Part of this argument about the totality of the Soviet government's control over its people stems from the traditional Communist-Nazi analogy. Americans were aware during World War II that Hitler's Germany had carefully controlled the information it had wished the German people to have. It was assumed in the United States after the war that Soviet control of information and propaganda for Russians was a replica of the German model and that the inevitable result of such an absence of free expression would be an aggressive Soviet war against democracy (also patterned on the German example).

Some American leaders praised the Russian people and lamented how they had been viciously crushed by the Soviet government. Lewis Brown, president of the Johns-Manville Corporation, testified in 1948 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that "the Russian people, like the German people, do not want to rule the world, but they are helpless slaves of the ruling clique that dominates the people through fear and terror, through concentration camps and secret police and through the whole mechanism of totalitarianism."<sup>14</sup>

Brown and others also equated the Russian exile and labor camps in Siberia with the Nazi death camps. While one must not condone the Soviet camps or minimize the suffering they have caused millions of Russians, it must also be recognized that they are not mass extermination camps like Auschwitz and Treblinka.<sup>15</sup> The genocide and unbridled terror in the Nazi camps were revealed in the overwhelming evidence presented at the Nuremberg trials. This vital aspect of the trials, however, soon became obscured in the mounting emotion of the "cold war," as Americans shifted their hatred and fear from Germany to Russia. Furthermore, the trials reinforced the popular American concept of totalitarianism. At Nuremberg, the Nazi war criminals portrayed themselves as innocent tools and pawns in the clutches of a political system that had allegedly directed their actions, thought, and morality.<sup>16</sup>

However, recent scholarship in German and Soviet history has cast doubt on the argument that the minds of Germans under Hitler and Russians under Stalin (and later Soviet leaders) were manipulated completely by their governments and that the people had no influence on their political systems. In the case of Hitler's Germany, the Allied seizure of tons of German records in 1945 has provided historians with a unique and extraordinary look inside the Nazi "Big Brother."<sup>17</sup>

Hitler's regime, according to its own documents, was not a monolithic system that scrupulously executed his every command.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, instruments of control like terror and propaganda were applied by the Nazis differently to the various segments of German society. Traditional German conservatives, for example, were hardly bothered. The working class was viewed with suspicion and carefully watched, but it too was wooed by the Nazi government because the regime was dedicated to territorial expansion through war and believed this would be impossible without mass popular support. William S. Allen, a leading historian in America of Hitler's Germany, has observed: "In fact, one can say that control was completely exerted only over Germany's Jews."<sup>19</sup>

Secret German policy and SS reports and records from the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, which were captured at the end of World War II and which measured German public opinion, have shown that Nazi censorship and propaganda were surprisingly limited in their success. The main goal of Nazi propaganda was to mobilize the population for war and, once in the war, to continue the psychological mobilization and maintain the fighting morale among both German troops and civilians. In some instances, propaganda produced results; anti-Jewish propaganda, which appealed to old German prejudices and ignorance, aided significantly Hitler's war against the Jews by solidifying among Germans a general indifference toward the fate of the victims.<sup>20</sup>

However, Nazi propaganda failed during World War II, for example, to persuade the Germans that the Russians were primitive Asiatic "subhumans." The Propaganda Ministry was also unable to convince Germans to accept the government's euthanasia program, or "mercy killing" of mentally retarded and other so-called "unproductive elements." According to the Nazi police and SS reports, propaganda was often countered among the German population by rumor started by foreign radio broadcasts which, despite severe penalties for listening to them, found eager audiences. Also, stories told by eye-witnesses--e.g., soldiers home on leave or bombed-out evacuees--frequently conflicted (and sharply) with government press reports. For example, the exaggerated claims of Nazi propaganda about the strength of German's air defenses lost credibility when Britain started bombing German towns and the German air force was unable to win the "battle of Britain."<sup>21</sup>

A special embarrassment for German propaganda was the flight in May 1941 of Hitler's Deputy Fuhrer, Rudolf Hess, to Britain. The official German explanation three days after the flight that Hess had been mentally ill met with disbelief and (even worse for the Nazi government's image) the response that Germany must be in a bad way if a man known to have been suffering from a serious mental disorder had nevertheless been allowed to continue holding high office. German propaganda was savagely criticized by all sections of the population; one police report noted:

German press and radio reports of the Hess affair were from the working class to the intelligensia described as very clumsy and bungling. These very reports have prompted people to concern themselves especially closely with the Hess case and have so shaken the confidence in German propaganda (the truthful press and radio reportage) that for the time being the whole press and radio reports will automatically be regarded as untrue.<sup>22</sup>

Even more disastrous for Nazi propaganda was the course of the German invasion of Russia, begun in June 1941. As the Russian war dragged on, it became obvious to Germans that propaganda claims that Germany could easily overrun the Soviet giant with feet of clay were untrue. Then came the battle of Stalingrad at the end of 1942; it was a military defeat and propaganda debacle of the greatest magnitude. It produced a major loss of confidence by Germans in their leadership, even including Hitler. This was the consequence in part of the wholly irresponsible and misleading Nazi propaganda on the war in Russia. Until the final weeks of Stalingrad, German newspapers were prophesying the imminent defeat of the encircled Soviet army (when, in fact, the reverse was true), arousing expectations in Germany that Stalingrad would soon be captured.<sup>23</sup>

To be sure, Nazi propaganda enjoyed some successes in the last years of the war, such as exploiting the German hatred toward the British and Americans stirred by Allied terror bombing of Germany. But propaganda continued to lose its effectiveness. On June 6, 1944, the day Allied troops started landing in France for the offensive against Germany from the West, a police report from Bavaria made the following assessment of the government's propaganda:

Propaganda: the opinion is widespread among the people that things are worse than we are told, and the comments can be heard: "We're lied to in this War just as much as we were in the last one." Above all, the many announcements of [Propaganda Minister] Dr. Goebbels in [the newspaper] 'Das Reich,' which up to now have never been followed by any action, have had an unsatisfactory effect in that they have for a long time aroused hopes and promised early fulfillment and now leave great disappointment in their wake. The people, also Party members, say it would be better if Dr. Goebbels didn't write anything more, since either he repeats what he has already said ten times or makes prophecies which are not fulfilled.<sup>24</sup>

Further, the escalating terror and repression against Germans by their own government during the war illustrated that the Nazi regime had failed to create a consensus of public opinion among the masses, except for the one that was the most unacceptable to the government--a consensus for ending the war. If it was not total mind control, but terror that persuaded Germans to follow Hitler into defeat and



destruction, that tragic process was encouraged by deep historical traditions in the country that had predated the Nazis by many years. The German heritage had included authoritarianism, militarism, and racism.<sup>25</sup>

Historians studying Russia have also recently produced evidence which suggests that the "cold war" image of Soviet society may not be as accurate as believed. For many years, students of Soviet history were blinded by the horrors of Joseph Stalin's purges and forced economic changes launching Russia toward socialism in the 1930s. Such changes had been carried out by the Stalinist police, state, and party bureaucracies. Stalinism, historians explained in the 1950s and 1960s, was the consequence of excessive bureaucratic terror and mind control (i.e. propaganda), similar to the process the world had seen in Hitler's Germany.<sup>26</sup>

But at the end of the 1960s, partly because of the revolt of Czechoslovakia in 1968 against Soviet rule and because of the publication in the West of studies by Russian dissidents, western historians started examining the social bases (i.e. the society) of the Soviet regime. A leading Soviet dissident, Roy Medvedev, who had been allowed to view the Communist party's archives and was once commissioned to write an official history of the party before he fell into disfavor with the government and his research was banned, admitted that despite the horrors of Stalin's policies, genuine popular support had existed among Russians for Stalinism:

The fact that most of the Soviet people trusted Stalin, the party leadership and the punitive agencies placed the victims of [Stalin's] repression in a tragic position. They were not guilty, but most people did not believe them, and turned their backs.<sup>27</sup>

Only recently have historians started to grasp that Stalin's massive economic reforms and expansion of the state's power in Russia produced a great proliferation of official (i.e. government) jobs and privileges, even creating a new Soviet working class and bureaucracy. Therefore, while many Russians were victimized by Stalinism, as Medvedev and others have shown, many more profited from and identified with it.<sup>28</sup>

The role of popular opinion in Soviet politics has, moreover, been illustrated by the dramatic controversy over Stalin inside Russia that has been smoldering since his death in 1953. Evidence suggests that when Nikita Khrushchev initiated his de-Stalinization campaign in 1956, he acted not merely from a narrow, bureaucratic struggle for power between him and his party rivals. His attack on Stalin was also prompted by mounting pressures from the Soviet military, seeking to rehabilitate itself after having been weakened and disgraced under Stalin. Pressure also apparently built from "below," however, among Soviet citizens, demanding radical change and a "thaw" in Soviet intellectual and cultural life. Petitions and pleas flooded Khrushchev's office and state and party agencies, and thousands of persons who had died or suffered in the notorious Siberian labor camps under Stalin were rehabilitated.

De-Stalinization, however, threatened to open the floodgate of economic and political change. Khrushchev's reforms, especially when they were not immediately successful

in agriculture and the Communist party, struck fear into an entire class of Soviet officials whose lives and positions were based on the rigidly state and party-controlled system Stalin had created. By 1964 these officials were bitterly opposing Khrushchev's efforts.<sup>29</sup> But the rebellion against de-Stalinization also came from the average Soviet citizen or, as Stephen Cohen, professor of politics at Princeton, has written recently:

from decent people who were not evil neo-Stalinists but who naturally composed the Soviet conservative majority. For them, ending the terror and making limited restitutions was one thing; desecration of the past and radical reforms in the Soviet order, for which they had sacrificed so much, was quite another. . . . A middle aged Soviet citizen in 1964 had grown to maturity during the hard Stalin years; and hard lives breed lacquered memories and conservative political attitudes.<sup>30</sup>

The Stalin controversy contributed to the ousting of Khrushchev in 1964 and the rise to power of Leonid Brezhnev, who reflected the growing public sentiment, slowly rehabilitated Stalin, and ruthlessly suppressed anti-Stalinists. The Stalin issue continues today among Russians, and sometimes even publicly. This was demonstrated by an incident aboard a crowded Moscow bus, witnessed by New York Times correspondent John Burns in March, 1983, on the thirtieth anniversary of Stalin's death. The incident, said Burns, was provoked by two young men. They were swarthy-looking, and apparently from one of the southern Soviet republics. A woman saw them and said, "If Stalin were alive, fellows like you would have been kept out of this city, back where you belong." Another passenger responded, however: "Stalin? How can you possibly speak of the man like that? He was a murderer." Others on the bus soon joined in, said Burns, and a furious debate unfolded.

This affair was suprising not so much for the divided opinion it reflected as for the fact that such a public discussion had occurred at all.<sup>31</sup> But there is other evidence that Soviet citizens today have views that are not blindly supportive of their government's policies. Various sources--such as outsiders visiting Russia, published Soviet opinion polls, and surveys of recent Jewish and other emigres from Russia--have indicated that Soviet opinion is considerably more pessimistic today about the Russian economy than three decades ago, when Stalin died.<sup>32</sup>

But such despondency is hardly the ingredient among Russians for resisting or seeking to abolish their present economic and political systems. In October, 1982, Marc Greenfield, an American student who spent two years as an English editor in Moscow for a Soviet press agency, described his image of the Russians by noting that his experience

has left me with an impression of an exhausted society trying to catch up with the West while hiding its backwardness from foreign eyes--far different from the menacing image of resolute Slavs girding for struggle with America that we

often receive at home. . . .Representative Russians, rather than members of the intellectual or official class, seemed to me to live in a mixed-up mental world. They regard themselves as the liberators, not the occupiers of Eastern Europe, and they cannot understand why there should be such great ill will toward them in those countries, which--they are well aware--enjoy higher living standards than they do. They are particularly perplexed by the "fuss" made over Poland, since the Poles are "known to be" slouches who already live too well for their own good.

In their talks with me, Russians visualized the outside world as a hostile camp ready to tear them apart. However, they regarded the United States with great respect and curiosity, and were tremendously impressed by what they knew of the American standard of living. On the other hand, Soviet society, with all its faults, seemed to meet their most important needs. This is the first generation of Russians since their revolution that has not known war or starvation, and their living standards, though low by our criteria, are higher than most Russians can remember. As for freedom, they seem to find enough of it in Russia's vast open spaces and in freedom from economic insecurity. With jobs guaranteed by the state, people can spend their last ruble without worrying about the next paycheck.<sup>33</sup>

At the least, such evidence suggests that the West must study the Soviet system further to comprehend fully how it works. With that in mind, six months ago, the United States government started a three-year \$7.5-million project to interview emigres from Russia.<sup>34</sup> At the most, research into Soviet public opinion hints that one can no longer flatly accept the view that the masses in Soviet Russia are the mindless pawns of their regime. Although Russia is in no way a democracy, public opinion has nevertheless commanded the attention of the Soviet government. These conclusions do not support the popular American notion that the Soviet Union is by nature so unfree that it cannot tolerate freedom elsewhere in the world and will seek to destroy it. Nor does the popular "cold war" idea that only a hardline policy toward Russia will produce changes there appear justified.

This raises the intriguing question: why not treat the Soviet Union like a nation that, similar to the western powers, has at least the semblance of a consensus among its people? With the potential for a nuclear holocaust now present on both sides of the globe, the United States cannot disarm or abdicate its position. But neither can it risk continuing to deal with the Russians according to the same old dubious "cold war" logic that says, as the British writer and colleague of Orwell, Dwight MacDonald, noted in 1945, that "Russian Communism had to turn out as it has because it now can be seen to have, in fact, turned out as it has."<sup>35</sup>



## NOTES

1Andy Rooney, "Reverse Resolutions Work Well," Greenville (S.C.) News, 29 December 1983.

2For example, "That Year is Almost Here," Time, 28 November 1983, p. 47, noted, "The impulse to hold Orwell's coat while sending his ghost out to battle [for one's cause] now seems pandemic." Moreover, said the magazine, "it is a surpassing irony that the title Orwell made famous has become a symptom of the very sloppiness he deplored: what he called a 'Meaningless Word,' a ramshackle abstraction inviting everyone to come in and stop thinking for a while." A few other examples of the recent attention lavished on Orwell are in Commonweal, 11 March 1983, pp. 149-51; Newsweek, 21 February 1983, pp. 53-55; Commentary, 75 (March 1983): 50-54; History Today, 33 (February 1983): 33-38; World Press Review, 30 (December 1983): 33-40; and People, 9 January 1983, pp. 38-45.

3"Man High on 1984 - Figuratively and Literally," Greenville (S.C.) News, 8 January 1984.

4"'Nineteen Eighty-Four' Is Best Seller Again," 18 January 1984; and "Privacy Threats Worry Americans," 8 December 1983, both in the New York Times (hereafter NYT).

5George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961), p. 176. See also, Harry C. Payne, "The Novel as Social History: A Reflection on Methodology," The History Teacher, 11 (May 1978): 341-51; and Hugh B. Hammett, et al, "Can the Teaching of History Survive 1984?" The History Teacher, 10 (February 1977): 229-48.

6Quoted in David Pryce-Jones, "Orwell's Reputation," in Miriam Gross, ed., The World of George Orwell (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 152.

7Quoted in Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's-1950's," American Historical Review, 75 (April 1970): 1049-50.

8Quotes are in *ibid.*, pp. 1054, 1056.

9See the evidence presented in Alan Wolfe, The Rise and Fall of the 'Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979), pp. 16-25. Note, moreover, regarding the distinction between the German drive for European domination and Soviet interest in revolution, Fred W. Neal, "The Cold War in Europe, 1945-1967," in N.D. Houghton, Struggle Against History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), pp. 20-25; Hans Buchheim, Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and Characteristics, trans. Ruth Hein (Middletown, Ct: Wesleyan University Press, 1968), p. 19; and Wolfgang Sauer, "National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?" American Historical Review, 73 (December 1967): 418-19.

10For example, see Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvard University Press, 1966), especially pp. 353-66. See, moreover, Brzezinski's article, "The Nature of the Soviet System," Slavic Review, 20 (October 1961): 351-68. An interesting analysis of the scholarly community's response to totalitarianism is William Welch, American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy: An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals From the Academic Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Despite important revisions, Hannah Arendt stressed the similarities between Nazism and Communism in the later editions of her book; note, for instance, The Origins of Totalitarianism

(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1966), p. 460. My comment on Senior Scholastic is based on various issues of the magazine during the 1960s; see, too, Howard D. Mehlinger, The Study of Totalitarianism: A Guide for Teachers (Washington, D.C.: Scholastic Magazines, Inc. 1965), pp. 54-60.

<sup>11</sup>Mortimer Chambers, et al, The Western Experience, 3rd ed., (New York: Knopf, 1983), 2: 1000. More recent editions of college textbooks appear to approach the subject in a more sophisticated and analytical fashion.

<sup>12</sup>NYT, 9 March 1983.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 28 May 1981.

<sup>14</sup>Quoted in Adler and Paterson, "Red Fascism," p. 1053.

<sup>15</sup>Compare, for example, the nature and goals of the Soviet camps, as discussed in Varlam Shalamov, Kolyma Tales (New York: Norton, 1980); Aleksandr M. Nekrich, The Punished Peoples (New York: Norton, 1978); Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, vols. 1-2 (New York: Harper & Row 1974); Lev Kopelev, The Education of a True Believer (New York: Harper & Row 1980); Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); Harvey Fireside, Soviet Psychoprisons (New York: Norton, 1979); and Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (New York: Praeger, 1968), with the aims and consequences of the Nazi camps, analyzed in Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975); Nora Levin, The Holocaust: The Destruction of European Jewry, 1933-1945 (New York: Crowell, 1968); Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Königstein/Ts., 1979); Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961); Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution, 3rd ed. (London: Barnes & Noble, 1971); Ota Kraus and Erich Kulka, Massenmord und Profit: Die Faschistische Ausrottungspolitik und Ihre Ökonomische Hintergründe (Berlin [East], 1963); and Yehuda Bauer, A History of the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

<sup>16</sup>See, for instance, Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (London: Basic Books 1977); Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germans: An Account of the 22 Defendants Before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Robert M. Kempner, Das Dritte Reich im Kreuzverhör (Königstein/Ts., 1980); Joe Heydecker and Johannes Leeb, Der Nürnberger Prozess: Neue Dokumente, Erkenntnisse und Analysen (Cologne, 1979); and Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (New York: Harper & Row, 1983).

<sup>17</sup>A fine summary of what is available is Robert Wolfe, ed., Captured German and Related Records: A National Archives Conference (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974).

<sup>18</sup>The best works on the nature and functioning of the Nazi bureaucracy are Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Jan Caplan, "Bureaucracy, Politics and the National Socialist State," in Peter D. Stachura, ed., The Shaping of the Nazi State (London: Barnes & Noble 1978), pp. 234-56; Karl Teppe, Provinz, Partei, Staat: Zur Provinziellen Selbstverwaltung im Dritten Reich Untersucht am Beispiel Westfalens (Münster i.W., 1977); Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers: Grundlegung und Entwicklung Seiner Inneren Verfassung (Munich, 1969); and Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich: Mit Ausgewählten Quellen zur Nationalsozialistischen Beamtenpolitik (Stuttgart, 1966).



19William S. Allen, "Totalitarianism: The Concept and the Reality," in Ernest A. Menze, ed., Totalitarianism Reconsidered (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1981), p. 99. On the Nazi Treatment of the working class, see especially Timothy Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft: Dokumente und Materialien zur Deutschen Arbeiterpolitik, 1936-1939 (Opladen, 1975). For works on the Nazi treatment of the Jews, see note 13 above.

20Ian Kershaw, "How Effective Was Nazi Propaganda?" in David Welch, ed., Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations (London: Barnes & Noble, 1983), pp. 190-92.

21See, for instance, Marlis G. Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans: Public Mood and Attitude During the Second World War (Athens: Ohio University Press 1977), pp. 72-85, 121, 128-29, 153-64; Heinz Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich: Auswahl aus den Geheimen Lageberichten des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS, 1939-1944 (Munich, 1968), pp. 34, 37-38, 61, 105-14, 192-95, 337-40, 346-48; Jay W. Baird, The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974); and Robert E. Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won (New York: Putnam, 1978).

22Kershaw, "How Effective Was Nazi Propaganda?" p. 196; and Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, p. 145.

23Steinert, Hitler's War, pp. 184-209; and Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, pp. 258-59, 262, 276, 278, 281, 184-85, 288-89, and 292.

24Kershaw, "How Effective Was Nazi Propaganda?" p. 199.

25The standard works on this subject are Hermann Glaser, The Cultural Roots of National Socialism, trans. Ernest Menze (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964); Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); and Gordon A. Craig, Germany, 1866-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

26This thesis, which excluded other factors equally responsible for Stalinism, characterized some of the best books in Soviet studies, such as Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New York: Random House, 1962); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); John A. Armstrong, The Politics of Totalitarianism (New York: Beacon, 1961); Max Schachtman, The Bureaucratic Revolution: The Rise of The Stalinist State (New York: DeKlare Press, 1962); and Conquest, The Great Terror.

27Though this can hardly be termed the thesis of his book, the view that the bulk of Russian people supported Stalin runs through the final pages of his work; Medvedev, Let History Judge, pp. 402, 413, 428. See, moreover, his On Socialist Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1975), p. 346.

28Medvedev, Let History Judge, pp. 413-16. Stephen F. Cohen, "Bolshevism and Stalinism," in Robert C. Tucker, Stalinism: Essays in Historical Literature (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 28, notes that "revolutions from above (a little-studied category) are by definition a great expansion of the state and its social functions, which means a great proliferation of



official jobs and privileges." There are also numerous firsthand testimonies to the religious and authentic nature of the "Stalin cult;" see, for instance, Abraham Brumberg, ed., In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 55, 320, 329; Medvedev, pp. 362-66; and Kopelev, The Education of a True Believer. David Schoenbaum's concept of a "revolution of status" in Nazi Germany possibly applies here; see his Hitler's Social Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1967), chaps. 8 and 9.

<sup>29</sup>An extensive and well-documented discussion is in Stephen F. Cohen, ed., An End to Silence: Uncensored Opinion in the Soviet Union (New York: Methuen, 1982), pp. 30-42; and Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power (New York: Norton, 1978), chaps. 1 and 2.

<sup>30</sup>Cohen, An End to Silence, pp. 41-42.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-50 and NYT, 6 March 1983.

<sup>32</sup>See, for example, John Bushnell, "The 'New Soviet Man' Turns Pessimist," in Stephen Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Robert Sharlet, eds., The Soviet Union Since Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 179-99.

<sup>33</sup>Marc Greenfield, "Life Among the Russians," New York Times Magazine, 24 October 1982, pp. 94-99, 104-08.

<sup>34</sup>NYT, 2 October 1983.

<sup>35</sup>Quoted in Cohen, "Bolshevism and Stalinism," p. 6.